the cases of Libya, Syria and Bahrain by Kabbara, Khaled
  
Lebanese American University 
 
International Intervention and the Arab uprisings: the 
cases of Libya, Syria and Bahrain 
 
By 
Khaled Kabbara 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School of Arts and Sciences 
August 2015
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2015 
Khaled Kabbara 
All rights reserved 
ii 
 
 
iii 
iv 
v 
Dedication Page 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my loving parents, 
I am, because of you. 
vi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
 
 
 
This thesis would not have been possible without the great support of my Advisor Dr. 
Marwan Rowayheb, for his patience and constant guidance in revising the numerous 
revisions of this thesis, and in helping me shape my ideas to prove the hypothesis in 
question. 
 Also special thanks to the committee members, Dr. Sami Baroudi and Dr. Walid 
Moubarak for agreeing to share their valuable experience and knowledge, I truly am 
grateful for your guidance and support throughout this assignment.  
vii 
International Intervention and the Arab uprisings: the 
cases of Libya, Syria and Bahrain 
Khaled Kabbara 
ABSTRACT 
Should every Human Rights violation lead to intervention? What are the major roles 
playing factors prompting the decision of intervention in the internal affairs of states? 
This thesis probes into subject matters on international intervention practices, causes 
and motives by studying the cases of Libya, Syria and Bahrain, and hence, analyzes 
each of the situations while basing the arguments on the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P) and Keneth Watlz's analysis of international affairs and intervention 
(representing the neorealist approach). Despite existing similarities between each of 
the presented cases – especially in terms of human rights violations – the 
international community's’ reaction and intervention implemented carried different 
nuances and forms. This thesis will argue that nowadays international military 
intervention can only occur when it's justified; whether in terms of human rights 
violations and/or through projecting the threat the situation creates as a global 
concern. Furthermore, it will demonstrate that not every peace threatening situation 
where human rights are being violated should result in a direct military intervention.  
In this respect, it discusses the prime reason which is mainly because states' interests 
continue to influence its actions, especially when deciding on how to respond to 
certain situations, whether to intervene militarily in the domestic affairs of states - in 
pursuit of preserving human rights and international peace and stability- or not. 
Keywords: Intervention, Human Rights, Realism, Arab spring, Libya, Syria, 
Bahrain, interest, Responsibility to Protect.  
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Chapter I 
 Introduction 
 
Intervention and the Arab uprisings 
Over the past twelve years, the international community has witnessed several 
instances of foreign military intervention in state’s internal affairs, an issue that has 
always been viewed as a tool in the hands of powerful states, holders of military and 
economic capabilities, assenting to them their active intervention in cases without 
taking into account the severe repercussions it could have.  In this respect, it would 
be adequate to cite as real-life examples countries like Afghanistan, followed by Iraq, 
and the recent case of Libya, making the issue of international military intervention 
one of the most controversial topics of our century.  
In 2011, the Arab world witnessed a series of demonstrations and uprisings, leading 
to the drowning of the region in a wave of political instability, with it being the 
triggering factor of a potential civil war outbreak in several cases. Each of these 
demonstrations and uprisings carried within its nuances elements of frustration and 
call for change, from political rights and freedom, to the need for economic and 
structural reform.  
The demonstrations in the Arab world were somehow similar in numerous instances, 
occurring in the form of protests, rallies, marches and strikes which, at many times, 
led to direct clashes with the ruling regimes' authorities, and reportedly resulting in a 
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considerable number of  civilians' casualties. The similarity also stretches to include 
elements of human rights violations as well as international and regional military 
intervention. 
Inevitably, the situation in the Arab world became one of the most debated topics 
amongst states, governments' officials, scholars and journalists. These units mainly 
discussed how the international community should respond to the unstable situations, 
where direct military intervention started to rise as a prominent action point aiming to 
end all clashes involving protestors, conflicting parties and the ruling regimes' 
authorities, and not to mention, to ensure the preserving of human rights values, 
civilian protection, and the maintenance of international peace and security. 
The question of direct intervention and sovereignty started to surface. It started to 
arise especially amongst political researchers who were arguing on the main 
characteristics of sovereignty where they considered that state's sovereignty, in its 
conventional sense, does not grant permission to a government to commit inhumane 
practices against its people through its sovereign rights. This issue would lead to 
being subject to direct international military intervention, in attempt to preserve the 
government’s humanitarian responsibilities. This intervention can be considered as a 
factor which reflects the rising importance of international values and standards, and 
the international community's responsibility, which are now based on the United 
Nations charter, relevant treaties and conventions, as well as the Universal 
Declaration of Human rights. 
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This thesis will be deeply probing into the issue of international military intervention, 
in light of the recent and ongoing situation in the middle-east, with a close emphasis 
on the case of Libya by comparing it to the developments in Bahrain and Syria, after 
a close revision of the internal situation in each of these countries, and identification 
of potential indicators, leading to direct military intervention.  
Ever since each of the cases represent regimes' that were/still in power for a long 
period of time, few had predicted that a revolution will materials swiftly– precisely in 
the cases of Libya and Syria – which consequences would proliferate and turn into a 
massive call for change and ousting the longstanding regimes. They also reveal how 
fragile these regimes are, and to what extend they're willing to use violence or 
oppressive measures to secure continuity and remain in power. Furthermore, these 
cases will reveal international community willingness/unwillingness to put its 
interests aside and act upon and intervene in the situation to preserve Human rights. 
This thesis will argue that nowadays international military intervention can only take 
place when it's justified, whether in terms of human rights violations or whether 
through projecting the threat the situation creates as a global concern. This thesis will 
demonstrate that in the case of Libya, the international community had intervened 
directly, however Syrian and Bahrain did not witness an intervention similar to the 
Libyan case. The international community has in fact intervened in states' domestic 
affairs on several occasions, in an attempt to preserve international values and 
standards.  
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If we look closely to the Libyan case, we deem it right to see that a revolution took 
place against the Kaddafi regime, which shortly evolved into a situation similar to a 
civil war, where clashes started to erupt across the country between the regimes' 
loyalists and the revolutionary groups. The situation led to massive violations of 
human rights and democracy, due to the increasing level of oppression practiced by 
the regime, as well as the atrocities that were committed against civilians.  
The international community's response to the situation in Libya was to intervene 
directly under the authorization of the United Nations Security Council and the 
command of the NATO. And so, airstrikes were conducted against strategic regime 
loyalists’ targets, helping the opposition gain control and topple down the Kaddafi 
regime. In light of this situation, the Libyan case will be regarded as an example to 
better answer the following question: will the international community intervene 
militarily against all governments that are violating human rights? 
However, in other cases no apparent intervention was observed, even though there 
were confirmed reports on cases of human rights violations, which represents an 
issue that raises the following question: what is the main motivating factor for states 
to interfere militarily in states' internal affairs? Is it states interest? Is it the collective 
responsibility to preserve international values, peace and stability? Or is it a blend of 
both factors? 
Nevertheless, by looking into these three cases, this thesis will also demonstrate that 
not every peace threatening situation would systematically call for a military 
intervention. And that is mainly because states' interests continue to influence its 
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actions, especially when deciding on how to respond to a certain situation, whether to 
intervene militarily in the domestic affairs of states, in pursuit of preserving human 
rights and international peace and stability, or not.  
Furthermore, this thesis will argue that although a justification – based on human 
rights and/or a threat to international peace and security- had become a prerequisite 
for military intervention. Thus, the political will of the state to intervene remains to 
be the major determining factor for intervention. This argument will be made evident 
by analyzing the different intervention practices in each of the Syrian and Bahraini 
cases and by comparing it to the Libyan one. 
Bahrain which was also affected by the revolutionary domino effect of the Arab 
world, a revolution against the ruling regime was calling for social justice and 
institutional monarchy, leading to an unstable situation, riots and confrontations 
between the security forces and the protestors, amidst several reported cases of 
human rights violations.   
However, the intervention which took place in Bahrain was different from the Libyan 
one. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) intervened militarily under the desert 
shield forces to end the revolutionary movements and riots, in support of the ruling 
regime and to maintain the stability of the gulf region. The international community's 
response to the Bahraini context was mainly rhetoric, viewing the issue as an internal 
challenge, and a regional matter to be dealt with by the regime and its regional allies. 
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The Syrian case on the other hand carries significant similarities between both the 
Libyan and Bahraini cases, as we give prominence to the fact that revolution is still 
ongoing for more than five years, creating a war-like crisis situation, atrocities and 
violations of human rights have been committed against civilians, and the number of 
refugees in neighboring country have reached its peek, thus far we see that no clear 
Intervention is yet expected to take place, similar to the cases of Libya and Bahrain. 
This thesis attempts to define the real causes of military intervention in today's 
political practices, by answering the following questions:  
 Was the military intervention in Libya in pursuit of preserving international 
ideas and values, such as democracy and human rights?  
 Was it an interest-based intervention to implement or prevent a specific 
political, economic or a social agenda in the country, with the forged 
justification of preserving international values and standards?  
 Why have Syria and Bahrain not witnessed an intervention similar to that of 
the Libyan one? 
This thesis will be referring contemporary military intervention practices to the 
theory of realism in each of Libyan, Syrian and Bahraini cases, in order to better 
understand intervention justifications and the role played by states' interests. It 
focuses mainly on Waltz's analysis of international affairs, who himself believes that 
the anarchic structure of the international system obliges states to prioritize their 
national security to better safeguard its interests.  
7 
This thesis looks into states intervention in the affairs of other states, and explains the 
reaction of the international community towards this intervention. If we look into the 
theories of international relations, there are two approaches that can explain when 
and why foreign intervention takes place. The first is neo-realism and the second 
approach is the responsibility to protect.  This thesis will argue that neither realism 
nor the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) known as being the doctrine which sets the 
framework and mechanism prompting direct military intervention in response to 
grave human rights violations, can on its own answer these questions.  Arguing that 
both theories and approaches should be blended together to better explain when do 
states intervene and why, in addition to understanding international community's 
reaction towards this intervention, as explained in the following chapters. 
Timeline and methodology 
This thesis will employ a comparative approach to present its arguments. It will look 
into the Libyan case and compare it to the cases of Syria and Bahrain in terms of the 
reaction of international community to the protests that were taking place in those 
countries. Additionally, this thesis will acutely examine and comment on the 
different forms of protests which occurred in each of the instances, and the way in 
which dissimilar political regimes reacted towards these protests. 
It will initially identify the different foreign and local actors involved in the three 
cases—Libya, Syria and Bahrain— investigate the main interest of the international 
actors involved in each case, and proceed to demonstrate how each of the actor(s) 
reacted and/or intervened in each of the presented cases. 
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As a result, this study will accordingly demonstrate that in all three cases violence—
to some extent — was committed against protestors and civilians. Furthermore, it 
will describe the diverse reactions that were adopted by the international community 
and that is according to the differences being principally due to the range of foreign 
power interests involved in each case, through referring each of the cases to the 
pillars of the responsibility to protect doctrine and the theory of realism while 
focusing mainly on the theory of Kenneth Waltz. 
Literature Review 
Although the Arab revolutions and uprising are comparatively recent, a large amount 
of literature has focused on the subject in order to take advantage of the phenomenon, 
and benefit from the numerous articles and books written on the subject. It is in that 
vein that this thesis will study key inputs that consist of analyzing the unstable 
situation in current Arab affairs, through studying classic political theories, and 
applying a contemporary analysis to the current Arab upheavals, not to mention 
focusing on the international community's response, in addition to looking into 
military intervention practices, means and motives. 
A text, for instance, may be mentioned as an example of these literary works such as 
Kenneth Pollak's "The Arab Awakening: America and the transformation of the 
Middle East", which tackles the issue of democratization and political structures of 
Arab states, commenting on the different protest movements that occurred through a 
state-by-state analysis. One can cite as another example also a work by James Petras, 
entitled "The Arab revolt and the imperialist counterattack", which questions the 
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intentions of the major powers’ responses to the unstable situation in the Arab region, 
and especially the NATO led campaign against the Kaddafi regime in Libya.  
However, "Syria - a Decade of Lost Chances: Repression and Revolution from 
Damascus Spring to Arab Spring" by Carsten Wieland, analyzes the socio-political 
situation in Syria through a series of interviews with Syrian opposition members, and 
describes the different characteristics of the Assad regime.  Additional books on this 
subject are found useful to guide this research, such as Lin Noueihed and Alex 
Warren's "The Battle for the Arab spring: revolution, counter-revolution and the 
making of a new era" and "the European Union and the Arab Spring: promoting 
democracy and human rights in the Middle East" by Joel Peters, and many more 
listed in the tentative bibliography.  
Other noteworthy texts describe the various means, circumstances, and challenges of 
intervention through analyzing several situations. One such work is "Humanitarian 
Intervention: Ideas in Action" by Thomas G. Weis, which provides an interesting 
introduction to the theory and practice of humanitarian assistance, and discusses the 
economic, political and ethical indicators potentially leading to military intervention, 
by examining prior divisive and controversial cases, and at last the UN’s role vis-à-
vis safeguarding protestors. Whilst Michael Walzer's "Just and Unjust Wars" was 
found useful in investigating the moral aspects which fall within the political sphere 
and in the examination of previous political and military practices from an ethical 
perspective. Watlzer explores and highlights several conflicts that occurred in the 
past. 
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Furthermore, In Agency and ethics: the politics of military intervention,  Anthony F. 
Lang, analyzes the role played by states political decision in providing aid or attempt 
to restore peace and stability, which is necessary for identifying the major motivating 
factors of the international community to intervene, an issue which often creates a 
rivalry between concerned and intervening powers.  On the other hand, In Legitimacy 
of humanitarian military intervention, the author looks into current practices through 
studying their means and outcomes as well as its justification complexity. While In 
The purpose of intervention: changing beliefs about the use of force, will be used to 
look into military intervention practices, its methods and motives, to better 
understand why and when the international community should use force, and where 
answers to these questions would be found: Is it to secure states interest, is it 
considered to be a response to humanitarian crises, or to preserve international peace 
and stability?. 
In addition, considering that the case studies employed in this research are amongst 
recent developments in international affairs, reports published by major think-tanks, 
international organizations, academic institutions and journals will be used to support 
the arguments and prove the presented hypothesis. As such, The Dilemma of 
Humanitarian Intervention published by the Council on Foreign Relation raises 
another important question on the role the international community should play in 
light of the escalating violance against civilians. It further  compares between what 
took place in Libya to the Syrian omnipresent case, in an attempt to understand the 
responsibility the international community holds to mount humanitarian intervention.  
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Periodical articles such the World Politics review's "R2P: Sovereignty and 
Intervention After Libya", examines the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, which 
resulted in the NATO-led air force intervention in Libya, and how it was put under 
scrutiny after the incident that occurred in this war zone, and delves into the rising 
concerns on states sovereignty and the international community's responsibility to 
preserve the values of human rights and international peace and security. 
Furthermore, the article also projects the role played by the will of the foreign states 
in determining the intervention in Libya.  Additionally, in the article Lessons of the 
Libya Intervention, published by the Atlantic, the author looks into the different 
opinion and positions towards the intervention that took place in Libya, especially on 
the role played by foreign states, mainly major powers in determining intervention. 
Moreover, Libya: thin line between respecting sovereignty and upholding human 
rights, looks into the role played by the international community and the different 
factors that motivated military intervention, in attempt to end ongoing atrocities 
against civilians and limit the international threatening situation it might generate. 
Also, the Battle for Bahrain: What One Uprising Meant for the Gulf States and Iran 
published by World Affairs Journal, discusses the role played by Gulf States 
concerns in light of the situation in Bahrain, and focuses mainly on how indirect 
factors such as interest and political influence had a key role to play in raising 
concerns about the region's stability, as well as foreign interests, leading to the 
intervention carried by the desert shield force with the aim of  limiting the forecasted 
negative consequences in the region and ensuring the region's stability. 
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This thesis will also be examining several reports published by international research 
and study centers and organizations, such as the one published by the National 
Democratic Institute titled "Now we have hope", which provides an insight on the 
revolution and the NATO’s assistance. In addition to articles written on the 
revolution in Bahrain on the issue of Repression and the escalating levels of violence 
in Syria, the above mentioned sources are valuable to sustain the arguments proposed 
about the motivation, timing, and the lawfulness of Intervention, to better compare 
the ways in which the international community responded to the situation in Syria, 
Libya, and Bahrain—such as BBC's "The Right to Intervene" by Lloyd N. Cutler, the 
New York Times " Military Points to Risks of a Syrian Intervention" by Elisabeth 
Bumiller, Foreign Policy's "The Strange Revolution in Bahrain, One Year On" by 
Christian Caryl.  Although the MA thesis presented at the Lebanese American 
University and entitled Libya, a case of political realism" by J. Kanaan, tries to study 
the theory of realism and the responsibility to protect while focusing mainly on the 
Libyan situation. 
The majority of the above listed resources have stressed on the notion of how states 
interests have prevailed states’ sovereignty, leading to the prevalence of the neo-
realist practices in today's international relations. Thus, this thesis will also be adding 
the elements of the responsibility to protect to the realist approach to better 
understand international community's involvement in intra-states conflicts. 
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Chapter II 
 International Intervention 
 
This chapter dwells into the subject of direct military intervention and how 
international actors justified their intervention in other states' affairs, and how the 
international community reacted towards this intervention. In order to do so, it will 
proceed by reviewing the relationship between the justification of international 
intervention and intervention itself, starting from the emergence of the Westphalia 
state system, to analyzing current practices, through providing a brief historical 
account on the development of the legal frameworks and mechanisms of 
intervention. Although international intervention can take place in different forms 
(i.e. economic, political or diplomatic), this thesis will be mainly investigating direct 
military intervention, since its application has always been regarded as a 
controversial one.  
In this respect, this thesis will argue that during the Westphalia state system, the 
theory of realism was the dominant theory in explaining military intervention. 
However, with the developments of international relations, realism can no longer be 
the dominant theory in explaining international intervention, seeing that the 
responsibility to protect nowadays plays another major role along with realism in 
understanding and explaining why and when international intervention should take 
place. 
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The "Westphalia" state system 
International intervention, in its contemporary definition, appeared when the nation-
state system came into existence with the series of peace treaties of Westphalia in 
1648, which terminated the anarchic structure of international affairs and limited all 
aspects of external influence
1
. Its objective could be summarized in the following 
sentence: "Who rules a region determines its religion". The provisions of this treaty 
led to the creation of the Westphalian state system, providing a state of 
independence, and introducing the concept of absolute sovereignty, a concept that 
was regarded as the main source of stability in the international system, and is based 
on self-contained autonomous states.  
The treaty of Westphalia guaranteed that no state should interfere in the internal 
affairs of other states, unless there has been a clear violation of a treaty, or in cases of 
self-defense
2
. This concept of sovereignty signified that no interference in any way 
from an external actor could be practiced in the internal affairs of another, where the 
ruling party solely practices its will within their territories, given by their sovereign 
rights. 
However, the Westphalia model failed to fully restrict intervention, and states 
continued to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states whenever its interests 
dictated so. Intervention used to occur to expand their territorial capacity, access to 
resources, influence and power, driven by the sole interest of the ruler.  
                                                          
1 Brown, Chris. Sovereignty, rights, and justice : international political theory today. Cambridge, U.K: 
Polity Press, 2002. 
2 Johnson, Geoffrey P. "Intervention in Libya erodes national soverignty." The Sun Times, 2011. 
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The treaty’s nuances assume that the state is a unitary actor, and war is exclusively 
waged to secure states interests or to preserve its security or power, through 
following the realist perspective
3
. Not to mention that intervention used to take place 
with or without having any legal or moral justification, given that the Westphalian 
model also holds states responsible for the protection of their citizens and the 
preservation of their territorial integrity and security.   
Accordingly, the realist approach was the best approach to explain when and why 
intervention in the domestic affairs of states used to happen.  
Realist theorists consider the state as the main and central actor in the international 
system, while describing the rest as secondary or less significant actors.  
Furthermore, realists tend to believe in the nonexistence of an overarching power 
greater than the state apt to implement laws and other regulations upon states. 
Consequently, and according to the theory of realism, the international system is of 
an anarchic structure, the theory also speculates that states’ highest goal and 
objective is to secure and ensure their own security and interest, where states cannot 
depend on one another and should be independent and self-sufficient in this matter
4
.
                                                          
3 Mastanduno, Gene Lyons and Micheal. Beyond Wetphalia: state Sovereignty and International 
Intervention - Council of foreign Relations. Oct. 1995. 
4 Dunne, T & B Schmidt. 2008. Realism. In: J. Baylis & S. Smith, Ed. The Globalization of World 
Politics Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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On Waltz's realism, intervention and international affairs 
Waltz considers that politics, just like society in general, is usually guided by 
objective rules rooted in human nature, where the essence of interest plays a major 
role in political determination and action. According to Waltz, states' actions could 
be explained by the international competition which limits states’ choices5. 
Accordingly, he characterizes the structure of the international system from a three 
pillar view, “ordering principles”, “the character of units”, and “the distribution of 
capabilities”6.  
In his first pillar, Waltz states which household systems are basically hierarchically 
organized, possessing a distinctive authority, which leads to an anarchic structure of 
the international system
7, one where there's a clear “lack of order and organization”8. 
In his second pillar, Waltz mentions that all states have a similar function in the 
international system and the only difference between them is a cultural one
9
; where 
he says and we quote:  “So long as anarchy endures, states remain like units”10. 
However, it is Waltz’s third pillar or element, the distribution of capabilities, which 
is considered to be the most a primordial factor to explain the different encounters in 
                                                          
5 Dunne, T & B Schmidt. 2008. Realism. In: J.Baylis & S.Smith, Ed. The Globalization of World 
Politics Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
6 Waltz, K. 1979. Theory of International Politics, London: Random House. 
7 Brown, C. 2005. “Understanding international relations” Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
8 Waltz, K. 1979. Theory of International Politics, London: Random House. 
9 Jackson, R& G. Sorenson. 2007. “Introduction to International Relations – Theories and 
approaches” Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
10 Waltz, K. 1979. Theory of International Politics London: Random House. 
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international affairs, quoting Waltz “structure of a system changes with changes in 
the distribution of capabilities across the systems’ units.”11 Subsequently, states are 
obliged to constantly change their position on international issues depending on their 
power and capabilities (or in response to the power of the other), the issue that may 
create an international power and security dilemma
12
. 
Waltz, along with many realists, believe that the differences in states policies are a 
result of their different capabilities, power and interests
13
, with them turning a blind 
eye to the role of Human Rights and other social standards in current international 
affairs practices.  
After carefully observing several international occurrences, it is still clear that 
realism continues to be the dominating theory that influences states' positions 
towards a certain crisis. However, and due to the rising importance of international 
values and standards presented by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the Responsibility to protect (R2P), states nowadays can no longer practice realism 
unilaterally. Hence, the only way a state can enforce its interests, power and 
influence over the international system is through projecting the threat a situation 
poses as an international one, and/or project grave violations of international values 
and standards such as human rights and democracy, and act upon these justifications 
through collective efforts and under the mandate of the United Nations. A situation 
                                                          
11Waltz, K. 1979. Theory of International Politics London: Random House. 
12 Brown, C. 2005. “Understanding international relations” Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
13 Dunne, T&B Schmidt. 2008. Realism. In: J. Baylis & S. Smith, Ed. The Globalization of World 
Politic Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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that can be clearly seen in each of the Libyan, Syrian and Bahraini cases, and 
discussed thoroughly in the following chapters. 
The United Nations system (1945- 1990) 
The Westphalia state-system and its terms of intervention remained to be the major 
element and actor of international relations until the mid-twentieth century, where 
this era witnessed the establishment of the United Nations, and the rising role of 
other international and regional organizations, following the end of the Second 
World War. 
The UN, along with other regional and international organizations, have adopted the 
sovereign state system and called for establishing a collective framework to preserve 
international peace and security. The framework was clearly stated in the UN charter 
to insure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states along with its 
responsibility towards the international community, non-intervention policies are 
now protected under customary International law and the UN charter article 2:4 & 
2:7
14
 as follows: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations"
15
 
"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
                                                          
14 Chesterman, Simon. Just war or just peace? : humanitarian intervention and international law. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
15 The United Nations Charter 
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state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter Vll"
16
 
Nevertheless the UN tried to improve and further develop the westphalian state 
system through establishing a legal framework that allows intervention, within the 
strict guidelines provided by its charter, where intervention can only be considered as 
a legally accepted option and that is when the domestic situation in the country 
threatens international peace and security.  
Furthermore, the United Nations charter provided member states with the proper 
legal mechanism for intervention, where it should only be carried out upon the 
authorization of the United Nations Security Council under chapter VII, and after 
exhausting all peaceful and diplomatic efforts methods to settle the situation. And 
thus, creating a new legal framework for intervention through collective actions, a 
framework which provided the United Nations Security Council with the right to use 
force collectively, to preserve and maintain international peace and security. 
However, during the cold war era, specifically between 1945 and 1990, the legal 
framework that was set by the UN charter failed to fully impose its restrictions on 
intervention. Consequently, states decisions to intervene militarily were mainly 
driven by their political interests, with or without holding any proper legal 
justification, and without taking into account the mechanisms determined by the UN 
                                                          
16 The United Nations Charter 
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charter, since during those times, military intervention used to happen to secure 
rivalry balance amongst the conflicting parties and in many cases to expand the 
power and influence each of the parties hold. 
As such, International instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, as well as the provisions of the UN charter, were extremely limited during the 
cold war, the increasing political rivalry between the east and the west, in addition to 
the lacking of a clear administrative structure for its implementation. These factors 
helped raise an issue that created a need to set a clear legal and administrative 
arrangement to preserve the main values presented by the UN charter, as well as 
preserving states sovereignty and the security of civilian individuals.  
The right to intervene 
Following the end of the cold war, crucial developments have led to the creation of a 
comprehensive legal framework for military intervention, which coincided with the 
emergence of the values of justice and reconciliation on the political sphere, 
rebuilding with it a political democratic system based on the values of human rights, 
in prevention of any potential future violations in regional and internal warfare
17
.   
As it will be demonstrated in the following sections, a threat to international peace 
and security can no longer serve as the only justification for intervention anymore. In 
fact, a violation of human rights and other international values and standards are now 
considered to be major prompting factors for foreign military intervention.  
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In the mid-1990s, military intervention has attained a level of consensus among 
states, basically on a proper conceptual and ethical approach concerning the 
legitimacy of international military intervention
18
. Due to the changing political and 
cultural identity, along with the evolution of international law, and including the 
individual as one of its main subjects, states currently have seemingly realized their 
responsibility and obligation towards protecting their own people
19
. Concurrently, 
international humanitarian intervention came into existence to serve the same 
purpose; however, several concerns about sovereignty, and territorial integrity started 
to rise, making it a contentious topic of debate on the international level.  
Accordingly, intervention was not only to be prompted by threats that might affect 
international peace and security. It indeed became a strategy aiming at preserving and 
protecting human rights and the security of individuals in conflict zones. As a matter 
of fact, it has been applied by the US in the mid-nineties when it intervened in 
Somalia, Haiti and Kosovo in an attempt to protect civilians, justifying their right to 
intervene in view of the brutal events that are taking place against them
20
 leading to 
humanitarian military intervention in situations where civilian individual's security is 
at risk, and human rights violations are being committed.  
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Humanitarian military intervention continues to be one of the most debated fields of 
international relations, especially when dealing with the issue of state's sovereignty.  
Its legitimacy continues to be one of the major challenges the international 
community faces, due to the complexity in identifying the legal standards that 
support the notion of intervention, attempting to balance the equation of its 
legitimacy and applicability, while preserving states’ sovereignty as well as 
international stability.  
Humanitarian military intervention has several valid and definitive arguments equally 
supporting and condemning its morality and legitimacy. Two different opinions 
analyze the issue of humanitarian military intervention and states sovereignty. The 
first opinion contends that the notion of humanitarian military intervention clashes 
with the Westphalian state system
21
, especially when dealing with issues related to 
sovereignty, while the other opinion justifies intervention as both a right and a 
responsibility. In fact, the second opinion claims that states have the right to maintain 
its sovereignty through preserving international values and standards. These 
developments have led to the emergence of humanitarian intervention against war, 
known as “the right to intervene”22. 
An effective way of identifying the current existing factors and legal standards that 
prompt international intervention, is to examine several political, legal, and 
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humanitarian indicators, such as international values and standards, and identifying 
the main role players in each of the cases, in addition to evaluating the necessity to 
intervene against the condemned parties, in attempt to secure humanitarian values 
and standards
23
.  
Unfortunately, even though humanitarian military intervention is now recognized as 
a  right which the international community holds to preserve human rights and insure 
civilian protection, it however failed to fully accomplish its humanitarian 
responsibility, such as the case of Rwanda in 1994, where it happened to be a little 
late when an intervention took place, due to lacking an explicit humanitarian 
framework that could have been adopted in situations where crimes against humanity 
are being committed. Viewing the actions implemented as belated, poorly executed 
and ineffective, the failure to act promptly in Rwanda was mainly due to lacking of 
both the clear administrative legal framework for its implementation as well as the 
interest factor. Thereby the international community only intervened when it was 
alarmed by the escalating humanitarian crisis. 
This crisis in Rwanda resulted in recognizing the necessity of creating a clear legal 
and humanitarian framework, to clearly define and organize the standards and 
notions which would insure the international community's right to protect human 
rights through a clear collective framework.  
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Unfortunately, humanitarian military intervention (also known as the right to 
intervene), did not succeed in limiting and administrating foreign military 
intervention, mainly because states interests are still considered to be the major 
influencing factor even in situations where massive violations of human rights are 
being committed. 
The responsibility to protect 
The developments that took place in the 1990s has signaled the necessity to create a 
more comprehensive framework, which would automatically identify international 
intervention prompting factors, to better understand why, when and how the 
international community should respond to situations where violations of human 
right are being committed. 
The U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan along with the Canadian government 
established an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS), with the purpose of setting a framework for the applicability and legitimacy 
of humanitarian intervention. This commission presented a report in 2001 on the 
responsibility to protect, providing several policy points to represent the foundations 
of an international policy debate, clarifying the issue concerning when and how the 
international community should respond towards a given crisis. The points were as 
follows: 
 The first contribution was to approach the humanitarian crisis situation from a 
responsibility to protect rather than the right to intervene, this shift in the 
25 
usage of words would help build consensus around the situation, especially in 
issues where claims about violating national sovereignty are raised. 
 The second contribution was on the issue of addressing states sovereignty as 
both a right and a responsibility, failing to protect its citizens would result in 
the loss of its sovereignty rights
24
. 
 The third contribution addresses the different standards, methods and 
strategies of intervention, such as the responsibility to prevent, through 
analyzing and dealing with the root causes of any internal conflict, the 
responsibility to react in response to compelling humanitarian situations, and 
at last the responsibility to rebuild which reasonably falls after the 
intervention occurs in assistance of the state that was subject to intervention.
25
  
 The fourth contribution of the ICISS was the one dealing with the guidelines 
and appropriateness of military action towards any situation. Concerning the 
issue of legitimate humanitarian intervention, the commission identified five 
different criteria the international community should examine before seeking 
direct actions, such as: 
1. Having a clear just cause; 
2. Holding the right intention of all intervening parties;  
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3. Viewing military intervention as ‘a last resort’ after failing to settle 
the ongoing issue peacefully; and 
4. The use of proportional means in term of planning the scale, intensity 
and duration of the military action, and having reasonable prospects 
to insure the fulfillment and success of these actions.   
And as a result of the 2001, 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center towers in 
New York, and the international community's preoccupation with the issue of 
terrorism, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) gradually gained international 
recognition.  
The first formal acceptance of the R2P came into force during the high level panel 
meeting on threats where member states endorsed the legitimacy criteria set by the 
ICISS under the United Nations Security Council
26
. 
The second milestone was made by the U.N. Secretary General himself through 
including the recommendations of the commission in the report that served as the 
basic document of the 2005 World Summit. Thereby, as a result, the Responsibility 
to Protect was included in its outcome document. 
This United Nations General Assembly outcome document called upon member 
states to act collectively against war crimes, genocide, and ethnic cleansing, 
compelling them to realize their collective responsibility to act, and their rights to 
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intervene in attempt to end all kind of violations of human rights. This was later 
followed by UN Security Council resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in 
armed conflicts, providing the responsibility to protect with a legal and ethical 
dimension for its application
27
. 
Thus, the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (R2P) was created by the United Nations 
in 2005 subsequent to a series of international efforts made by the UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan, urging member states to realize their individual responsibility 
towards protecting individuals through collective measures
28
. This would be a mean 
to end all atrocities committed against civilians, and discontinue all types of war 
crimes. The adoption of the responsibility to protect provided the international 
community with the legal multilateral resource for legitimizing intervention
29
.  
However, regarding the question of the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention and 
states sovereignty, the responsibility to protect continues to be a debatable issue 
among international law researchers, arguing that the responsibility to protect is 
interpretable in different ways based on the factors involved. The concept of 
sovereignty is also viewed as reasonability rather than a right, while arguing that the 
responsibility to protect is a different form of international humanitarian intervention. 
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In this respect, the state would be accused of committing atrocities if it is not willing 
to fulfill its responsibility to protect its citizens.  
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is generally viewed as a mean to tighten and 
strengthen international collective security through providing several bases on the 
authorization of the use of force, in response to crisis situations depending on the 
severity of the threat the crisis poses on civilians and international stability. The 
purpose of any direct military action or use of force ought to be to preserve the 
values it stands for, and should be used as a last resort after conceiving all political 
and diplomatic efforts to end the crisis. 
Nowadays, the responsibility to protect is still facing several challenges in its 
application, the first being the capacity of the state to join a collective military action 
due to its limited resources from troop deployments to commanding the actions. 
The second challenge intervention legitimacy faces would be the mobilization of the 
political will of the states to respond towards a certain situation, in both military and 
non-military action required cases, bearing in mind that the international community 
responds differently towards situations due to differences in their political will, 
interests as well as capabilities. 
The realist theorists argue that these differences in the approaches implemented by 
the international community are due to the states political will to intervene: the lack 
of resources, and most importantly state’s interest to intervene in certain situations 
and how it acts according to its preferences when it comes to landing a hand to one 
29 
country instead of another. However, these differences do not delegitimize 
international actions towards a situation similar to another where intervention was 
not practiced. 
After the realization of the notions discussed earlier, one can conclude that the 
morality of international intervention practiced nowadays by states, and supported by 
many international organizations, such as the UN, is based on both moral values and 
political motivation. Military intervention is not only limited to securing the interest 
of the interfering states, but also to ensure the protection of civilians and to maintain 
international peace and stability, in times when regimes are unwilling or unable to 
protect their citizens. 
The (R2P) was necessary because the traditional conception of sovereignty proposed 
by the treaty of Westphalia could no longer serve as a road map for international 
intervention, even the UN charter, which mainly supports a non-intervention policy, 
continues to be ambiguous in determining the supremacy of international values and 
standards, such as Human Rights and Democracy, over the sovereignty of states.  
On the other hand, international affairs researchers view the right to intervene as an 
inconsistent instrument, due to the different factors relating to the notion of 
intervention, driven by national interests, which happen to contradict with the values 
of self-determination and democracy already existing in the R2P
30
, where 
international military intervention should only occur after balancing the weighed 
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national sovereignty against individual's security. If we closely examine current 
international relations, we find a tendency by the international community to 
consider humanitarian military intervention as legitimate. However, the cases 
presented here reveal that this statement does not fully reflect the accuracy of this 
statement. Humanitarian military intervention as these cases will demonstrate is still 
determined by states interests and not only through moral arguments or human rights 
consideration. 
Nowadays, elements of realism continue to shape today's foreign policies. However, 
it cannot be solely implemented without a proper justification, backed by human 
rights and values violations, and justified by a direct threat to international peace and 
security and/or in response to massive violations of Human rights.
31 
Chapter III 
The Arab uprisings and International military 
intervention: what happened?” 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the reactions practiced by the 
ruling regimes were similar in terms of dealing with the protests and the political 
opposition, whenever there was an obvious violation of human rights. It will further 
demonstrate that the international community did not react in a similar way in all of 
the presented cases. For each case, this chapter will investigate the causes of the 
protests, the reactions of the political regimes Vis a Vis the reactions adopted by the 
international community to the events taking place. 
On Libya 
Historical overview 
This North African state, bordering Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan, Chad, Niger and Egypt 
was ruled by Mouammar Kaddafi ever since 1969, after a successful coup had 
toppled King Idris, replacing him with the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council 
(RCC)  headed by Kaddafi.  The latter swiftly proclaimed the establishment of a new 
Libya under the values of freedom, unity, and socialism, in an attempt to achieve a 
prosperous future for the country
31
. 
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After almost four years, and particularly in 1973, Kaddafi's vision concerning 
Libya’s future called for a transition, through both a cultural and a popular revolution 
against the ongoing corrupt bureaucracy, challenging the people to revolt and take 
over the administration through establishing popular people-powered regional 
committees, which eventually became responsible for the local and regional 
administration of the country.  
This popular revolution eventually led to the creation of a new political structure 
represented by the General People's Congress in 1977 replacing the RCC in power. It 
adopted the Declaration of the Establishment of the People's Authority, designating 
the revolution’s principal actor, Mouammar Kaddafi, Secretary General of the 
General People's Congress (GPC), as the leader the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
7
.  
It is worth noting that Mouammar Kaddafi has played a significant role in the region 
in spite of his controversial and fluctuating political views and forms of alignment. 
His initial basic principles of Libya's foreign policy were based on the idea of Arab 
states unity, support for Palestinian, as well as all forms of foreign influence and 
intervention in the regional affairs of Libya and Arab states. These principles, 
however, made his foreign relations extremely hard to maintain
8
.  
Nevertheless, regardless of the strained international relations, Libya remained an 
important player in the region, maintaining its position as a major North African 
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country with a significant amount of oil reserve, located in an economically strategic 
geopolitical position between Africa and Europe.  
Libyan natural resources such as oil turned out to be both a mean for advancing 
economic and social development, and also a tool to enforce Libya’s political 
participation and outlook in Middle Eastern and North African political sphere. 
Kaddafi continuously promoted the notion of an oil embargo as a pressuring method 
against Western policies in the Middle East: a policy that inevitably led to creating 
tense relations with the West
32
. 
The Libyan regime’s role continued to be a controversial one, due to its flagrant 
support for the use of force against western interests and practices in the region, and 
not to mention its siding with controversial and unpopular leaders in neighboring 
countries.  
In 1992, Libya was held responsible for two memorable incidents: the Lockerbie 
affair involving the destruction of the Pan Am aircraft, flight 103, over Scotland, and 
the UTA flight 772 over Niger and Chad. These accusations were made after 
investigations revealed the participation of senior Libyan government officials in 
those airline disasters. The international community denounced these incidents as 
acts of terrorism, with the United Nations Security Council passing a resolution 
condemning the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. It obliged the country to abide by the 
investigation requests related to the incidents, and to cease all kinds of terrorist acts. 
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Furthermore, the Security Council imposed a set of strictly observed political and 
economic sanctions
9
. 
After almost a decade, Libya gradually made significant efforts to improve its 
relations with the West. This occurred through a series of dramatic policy changes, 
and turning in of the Lockerbie suspects for trial. Subsequently, after a series of 
protracted diplomatic negotiations with UN officials, previously imposed sanctions 
on the country were suspended
11
.  
In addition, in the aftermath of the Operation Iraqi freedom and the ousting of 
Saddam Hussein by the western coalition in 2003, Libya decided to cease its 
weapons of mass destruction program, and initiated the process of compensating 
those affected by the Lockerbie incident, which is an event that was regarded as a 
positive attempt towards improving its relations with the West,
33
. 
However, with the January 2011 revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, Kaddafi 
demonstrated staunch support for the former presidents in those countries against the 
protestors, as he viewed the uprisings as conspiracies against the ruling regimes 
abetted and encouraged by Western countries and interests.  
The progress Libya had made in its foreign relations over the past decade started to 
decline, particularly suffering from an immediate and significant setback due to its 
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severe response to its own protests a month later. And from this point forward, Libya 
was included in the series of protests and revolutions occurring in the Arab region.   
The Libyan revolution  
The Libyan revolution manifested a similar spirit of energy, enthusiasm, and 
eagerness for change that its neighboring upheavals had exhibited. Various segments 
of the population mobilized, confident of the values the revolution embodied. The 
protests spread across the country
34
, and by February 2011, the country began to 
collapse. Amidst the arrest of human rights activists during the riots in the 
northeastern city of Benghazi, anti-government armed groups attempted to evict the 
Kaddafi loyalist forces in the city of Misrata, seeking to oust Kaddafi from power, 
where police were forced away and local popular administrative committees assumed 
control of the city’s administration. 
The regime’s reactions towards the events in Benghazi were anticipated, Kaddafi 
faced the threat of following in the footsteps of his neighboring ousted presidents. 
His steadfast troops obeyed his commands, and endeavored to oppress the revolts, 
forcing them to end their protests immediately. However, this has failed after the 
opposition’s refusal to back down, and violence erupted between the insurgents and 
armed forces. A large number of killings were committed in an attempt to regain 
control of the city and several other regions surrounding the capital. Shortly, several 
senior government officials responded to the massive use of force by the regime’s 
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armed forces by immediately resigning, denouncing the Kaddafi’s actions against the 
protestors, in addition to several important members of the diplomatic corps 
representing the regime in the Arab League, the United Nations, and the European 
Union condemned their government, stating that they no longer represented the 
Kaddafi regime, and thus hoping to eventually  isolate the regime at the international 
level
35
. However, the Libyan opposition persisted with its protests turning into a 
rebellion that spread across the country
36
, and thus, attaining rule over several 
regions and vital urban centers, amidst the mounting regional and international 
pressure on the regime. Events in Libya evolved from being merely a popular 
revolution calling for change and reform, into what has been described as a civil war 
between an armed opposition and the ruling regime.  
These developments have led to the establishment of the Libyan National 
Transitional Council (NTC) in February 2011. Functioning as a de facto resistance 
government and representing the revolution against the Kaddafi regime in the city of 
Benghazi. The NTC played a huge role in the escalation of the Libyan situation, after 
it had declared itself the sole legitimate body to represent the Libyan people, 
acquiring international recognition, and offered the Libyan seat at the United 
Nations
37
.   
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Intervention and the Libyan context 
In early March 2011, and amidst the beginning of the revolutionary spark in the Arab 
Jamahiriya, the French president Nicolas Sarkozy requested that the European Union 
freezes all assets of the Kaddafi regime, including those of his inner circle of family 
members and advisors
38
.  
France, along with the United Kingdom, were amongst the first countries to propose 
an international military intervention through targeted airstrikes against the Kaddafi 
forces as a defensive measure, to prevent the regime from the possibility of 
employing chemical weapons against civilians and protestors
39
. The French position 
pressed for intervention under the NATO umbrella. It would be interesting to note 
that it was also the first to recognize the legitimacy of the NTC as the official 
representative of the Libyan people
40
. 
The United Kingdom on the other hand, through its Prime Minister, wished to 
promptly act upon the situation in Libya by mobilizing members of the United 
Nations Security council in support of a UN Security Council resolution calling for 
direct military intervention. The UK held several bilateral meetings to mobilize 
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countries in support of the establishment of a no-fly zone, preventing the usage of 
airplanes, helicopters and mercenaries against the protestors
41
.  
Meanwhile, the United States of America was observing attentively the whole 
situation in the Middle East and North Africa, recognizing the universal rights of the 
people of Libya who "were met by an iron fist" – as described by its president42. 
Alarmed by the escalating violence and injustice committed against civilians, and 
with an emphasis on the subject of the regional position of the Arab league and 
international preoccupation with the Libyan situation, The US president delivered a 
speech which focused on the humanitarian crisis, engendered by Kaddafi, which was   
affecting the regional security and safety of US allies
43
. Furthermore, he held the 
Kaddafi regime accountable for all atrocities committed, and expressed support for 
the UN resolution, calling for the use of all measures to protect civilians, the latter 
further declared that "The violence must stop. Muammar Gaddafi has lost the 
legitimacy to lead and he must leave."
44
  
In addition, US Secretary of State played another active role on the international 
scene, claiming that "now it is time to stop this unacceptable bloodshed"
45
, while 
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additionally stressing on the "responsibility of the Libyan Government to respect the 
universal rights of the people", and that "Kaddafi must go"
46
. 
On March 14, 2011, and upon the establishment of the NTC, the US was among the 
first states to recognize its supremacy through holding meetings with several of its 
representatives in Paris, thus acknowledging it as the only legitimate Libyan 
authority
47
. 
These almost unanimous responses to the Libyan crisis represented by three major 
international role players led to the London Conference on Libya where the gathering 
agreed on establishing the Libyan Contact group, supporting the NTC in ousting 
Kaddafi from power, and attempting to cease the violence occurring in various 
Libyan regions between Kaddafi loyalists and the armed opposition. This 
international group included France, the UK, the US, the European Union, the Arab 
League, and the United Nations, in addition to several other states as contributing 
members and observers
48
.   
As the intensity of the clashes between the regime forces and the armed opposition 
continued to escalate, while causing massive civilian casualties, Libya was placed 
under the international spotlight. Acknowledging the threat the ongoing situation 
represented both regionally and internationally, opponents of the Kaddafi regime 
mobilized members of the international community, including the Arab League, the 
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African Union and the United Nations, to counter the violence committed by the 
Libyan government. They further urged Kaddafi to immediately cease his violent 
actions, and abide by the international law and its humanitarian responsibility.   
Furthermore, Ban Ki-moon, the United Nations Secretary General, declared that 
"violations of Human rights will not be tolerated and those responsible will be 
punished"
49
. 
On February 26, 2011, the U.N.’s Security Council passed resolution 1970 that the 
Libyan regime has been unanimously condemned for charges of severe human rights 
violations through the use of force against civilians. It also reminded its leadership of 
its responsibility to protect its citizens, and to respect their freedom of expression and 
assembly. The resolution also reaffirmed its strong commitment towards respecting 
Libyan sovereignty and territorial integrity
50
.  
The Security Council resolution 1970 referred to the International Criminal Court on 
the necessity of investigating and prosecuting all parties involved in the serious 
violations of human rights, imposing an arms embargo against the regime, in addition 
to calling upon all member states to freeze all assets, financial and economic 
resources of the ruling regime and other senior officials
51
.  Shortly after, the 
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European Union approved the sanctions against Kaddafi and several other senior 
officials. The provisions of this resolution gradually proceeded to become effective. .  
This resolution was viewed as an early warning in an attempt to discontinue the 
violent clashes occurring between the Kaddafi loyalists and the insurgents, holding 
Kaddafi accountable for all violations of Human rights and international 
humanitarian laws, as evidenced by his employment of force against civilians and 
protestors, and use of mercenaries. 
In recognition of the Libyan predicament’s relentless severity, the United Nation 
Human Rights Council deprived Libya of its membership
52
, and on March 17, 2011, 
the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1973, calling for measures to 
end the ongoing violent situation in Libya. It imposed a no-fly zone on its airspace, 
and urged an immediate ceasefire in an attempt to desist all atrocities committed 
against civilians
53
. Nevertheless, the cessation of hostilities was merely temporary 
since the Kaddafi armed forces resumed to press forward towards the city of 
Benghazi, backed by heavy artillery, in an attempt to regain control of this strategic 
city.  
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As a response to this, Kaddafi threatened in a televised speech to hunt down the 
"rebellious protestors" in each of the country's corners, alley to alley, neighborhood 
to neighborhood, and house to house”54. 
Another international endeavor to end the violent clashes or ‘civil war’ between 
Kaddafi and the armed opposition offered itself through resolution 1973 under the 
responsibility to protect. This resolution included within its provision strong 
condemnations and calls for immediate action by the international community to end 
the violent situation the Libyan population suffered, by authorizing the use of force 
under chapter VII of the United Nations charter. This consisted of a demand for a 
military intervention to protect the Libyan civilians through the use of NATO forces 
and support of Arab states. 
"Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting 
nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in 
cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, 
notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and 
civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any 
part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the 
Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the 
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authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council"
55
 
Furthermore, this resolution created a legal framework for imposing a no-fly zone 
through a general ban on all flights over the Libyan airspace, in addition to viewing 
the use of force by the Kaddafi loyalists as crimes against humanity. It subsequently 
led to tightening the sanctions against the regime officials and the Kaddafi family
56
. 
After almost six month of direct clashes between both parties represented by the 
Libyan opposition and the Kaddafi regime loyalists, the international community 
decided to intervene in order to terminate the atrocities practiced by the regime 
against its people. Consequently, upon the authorization of the United Nations 
Security Council, NATO forces through the usage of French, British, and American 
warships and warplanes intruded blatantly, launching a series of airstrikes against the 
Kaddafi loyalists, destroying and disabling the regime's air force and other strategic 
military bases and locations, forcing his troops to withdraw or surrender, and cease 
the violent aggressions practiced against civilians and protestors. This international 
military intervention in Libya ended following the death of Kaddafi, thus concluding 
his forty-two year rule over the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The Libyan Transitional 
Council assumed control over Libya on October 31, 2011
57
. 
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On Syria  
Historical overview 
Syria has a major significance in both the regional and international scene, given its 
strategic geographical location on the eastern hub of the Mediterranean. The 
country’s location played a massive role in facilitating international trade lines 
represented by the city of Aleppo -one of the main cities of the Silk Road
58
- in 
addition to the historical role Damascus has proved to be of utmost importance 
during the rule of the Islamic Civilization
59
.  
The complexity of the Syrian demographics includes several ethnic, religious and 
sectarian groups, each of which managed to establish its own relations with 
neighboring Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. This issue has led to making Syria a 
fertile soil for attracting regional occurrences' spillover effects
60
.  
The capital city of Damascus is one of the oldest inhabited cities in the region. 
History shows that at the end of World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire 
in 1918, modern Syria emerged as one of the largest established Arab states
61
. The 
country was placed under the French mandate until 1946, and later gained its 
independence as a parliamentary republic.  
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Syria played a distinctive role in Middle Eastern affairs and the Arab/Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. However, it suffered from a lengthy period of political instability 
owing it to the occurrence of several military coups where the country ceaselessly 
alternated between civilian government and military power
62
.  
In the period between 1959 and 1961, Syria entered a union with Egypt creating the 
United Arab Republic. The union was terminated with yet another military coup that 
took place in Damascus in 1963 establishing the supremacy of a Baathist cabinet. 
Thereby, Syria’s political situation remained unstable with the birth of a significant 
number of additional coups and regional disturbances until 1970, when Hafez Assad 
became president. He unseated president Atassi with the support of the Baathist 
party, creating one of the most impressive police states in modern history.  
However, tension continued to exist when the opposing Muslim brotherhood initiated 
a campaign against Assad's rule, which started another wave of unstable security 
incidences amidst the growing hatred between the ruling secular party controlled by 
the Allawite minority and the Sunni-Muslim Brotherhood, and ended finally in 1982, 
subsequent to a brutal crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood in their strategic 
city of Hamah
63
.
 
 
Assad continued ruling Syria according to the "stability for obedience" rule, with the 
country becoming one of the most stable countries in the region. It has been 
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controlled and ruled by the Baathist party ever since 1963
64
. The regime was viewed 
by Western countries as politically repressive and violent, through enforcing tight 
security measures and limitations of political rights.  
Additionally, Syria has an active regional and political role, assuming a prominent 
part in the wars against Israel, intervening in the Lebanese Civil War, and supporting 
both Iran and Kuwait in their battles against Iraq due to the historical rivalry between 
both Baathist parties (the Iraqi and Syrian one). Syria’s assistance to its allies 
manifested itself when it joined the US-lead International coalition against the Iraqi 
occupation of Kuwait in 1991
65
.  
 In June 10, 2000, following the sudden death of President Hafez Assad, his son 
Bashar Assad assumed power. Bashar, who is married to a Sunni Muslim, was 
welcomed and viewed positively as a means to easing the tension between the Sunni 
and ruling Allawite communities. His inaugural speech included elements of political 
reform
66
. 
The Syrian revolution 
In March 2011, the popularity of the ruling regime, and mainly the president, 
declined amidst the extensive oppression practiced against the various 
demonstrations occurring in rural Syrian regions calling for reform and justice.  
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Syria’s revolution began amongst the increasing sense of activism and change in the 
region represented by the ongoing demonstrations and uprising in neighboring and 
allied Arab states.  
Similarly, the Syrian people began to tentatively realize the adverse conditions of 
their existence. Subsequently, they decided to actively engage themselves in shaping 
the future of the country and region as a whole
67
.  
The demonstrations manifesting in Syria carried within its nuances several elements 
dating back to its ancient and modern history, involving the power struggle between 
the Sunni majority and Alewite minority
68
.  
The first wave of ongoing uprisings and series of demonstration started in Syria’s 
capital, Damascus, and the southern city of Daraa named respectively as the "day of 
Rage" and the “Day of Dignity". These uprisings called for fair political and social 
reform. Reports on the ongoing unstable situation mention that these demonstrations 
encountered a violent response by the Syrian regime's military
69
, and were followed 
by a campaign of "unlawful" arrests aimed at those responsible for damaging the 
state's and regime's reputation and triggering internal instability as framed by the 
regime. As such, the families of those detained along with a number of activists 
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organized another demonstration requesting the immediate release of all political 
prisoners, fact which proceeded to ‘spark off’ the Syrian unrest situation70.  
The revolution began as a civil movement calling for the respect of citizens’ 
universal rights, social justice, state reform, and political freedom against the 
Baathist ruling party. The situation developed into a nationwide series of uprisings 
and demonstrations in several rural Syrian areas, supporting those protesting in Daraa 
against the ruling regime
71
.  
In response, The Syrian government announced several measures to contain the 
demands and facilitate the ending of the rising chaotic situation. The president 
released a number of political prisoners and dismissed the functioning government, 
in addition to lifting the state of emergency that has been in effect for the past five 
decades
72
, since Hafez Assad under the Baathist party seized power. The Syrian 
president Bashar also announced his endorsement of a law to regulate protests. This 
conciliatory approach paved the way towards achieving other demands made by the 
protestors, such as freeing thousands of political prisoners held without trial, and the 
clearing of article 8 from the Syrian constitution in which the following is stated:  
Article 8 [Baath Party] "The leading party in the society and the state is the Socialist 
Arab Baath Party. It leads a patriotic and progressive front seeking to unify the 
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resources of the people's masses and place them at the service of the Arab nation's 
goals" 
The days following the reforms were announced the protest reached its highest peak, 
followed by a heavy and intense crackdown by the regime as reported. Several 
human rights activists and eyewitnesses reported that a number of protestors were 
killed by the regimes armed forces, using gunfire and tear gas in an attempt to 
disperse the protests. The army, backed by its heavy weaponry, deployed itself closer 
to the city of Daraa and in central Homs, two of Syria’s largest cities, in defense 
against the armed rebellious groups responsible for the chaos and unrest in Syria, as 
described by the authorities
73
. A newly appointed cabinet promised the rise of a new 
era of civic liberty empowerment
74
.  
However, these reform attempts failed to ease the internal unstable situation.  
Thousands of Syrians flooded the streets of several major Syrian cities holding 
weekly demonstrations across Syria were being organized in defiance of the regimes 
armed forces, calling for freedom against the oppressive measures adopted by the 
regime.  
The incessant political reform efforts by President Bashar Assad failed to dampen the 
revolution
75
. Daraa, Homs, Hamah, Aleppo, rural Damascus, and remote areas of 
Syria, witnessed further protests against the ruling regime wishing to oust President 
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Bashar al Assad from power. This transformed the internal situation in Syria from a 
series of peaceful protest, to a situation similar to that of a civil war between the 
opposition calling for the ousting of Assad and the latter's ruling regime. 
The Syrian opposition managed to establish several coalitions, councils, and fronts 
during the Syrian crisis in an attempt to unify the different opposition groups and to 
set a vision for the future of the country. One of the major coalitions is the Syrian 
National Coalition that was established on July, 2012, serving as the administrative 
structure of the Syrian opposition.  
The SNC included the Free Syrian Army (FSA) which was created after several 
Syrian army generals and troops started defecting from the regimes’ armed forces 
with a number of army generals refusing to employ force against the protestors as 
declared, becoming members of the FSA while encouraging other military personnel 
to defect and join their organization in support of Syrian people desiring to cease 
atrocities committed by the regimes army.  
This establishment was a turning point in the ongoing Syrian situation, 
revolutionizing it into a rivalry battlefield to free the Syrian cities under the so-called 
regimes Army siege by adding another dimension in the pursuit of ousting Assad 
from power, where the FSA, through its guerilla style tactics, has managed to gain 
control over several areas as major new corporations reported on the developments in 
the Syrian situation.  
51 
However, the better organized and significantly armed army continued to advance in 
pursuit of regaining control and stability in the Syrian rural regions. These 
developments in the Syrian situation lead the international community to intervene 
indirectly through declaring their support to the FSA, providing it with 
communication and shielding equipment as a first step.  
However, the regimes’ armed forces intensified their security measures in several 
Syrian cities, deploying checkpoints and naval forces in coastal areas, preventing an 
overnight surge of any anti-government protests in the capitals’ suburbs from 
spreading to the heart of Damascus, and confronting local opposition groups in 
several Syrian towns. This resulted, according to eyewitnesses, with a mass killing of 
demonstrators, increasing the level of protests and direct clashes between the FSA 
supporters and the armed forces. These incidents happen to have coincided with an 
increasing rate of army defections, and the international recognition of the opposition 
which lead to the creation of the Syrian National Council in August, 2011, 
representing the demands of the Syrian people, and including a coalition of different 
opposition groups. The opposition groups evolved into the National Coalition for 
Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces - a coalition that included several 
political and armed opposition groups replacing the Assad government, and 
supporting the FSA operations against the regime’s armed forces, effectively creating 
an anti-Assad interim government. 
In response to what was taking place in Syria, the Arab League managed to reach an 
agreement with the Syrian president in November, 2011. The agreement was to 
52 
immediately cease all military operations against the protestors and civilians, and 
hold a national dialogue to determine the future of Syria
76
. However, this pact failed 
when the Syrian government was accused of adopting insufficient measures towards 
implementing its provisions and protecting its citizens. As a way of acting in 
response to this epic failure, member states of the Arab league voted in favor of 
suspending Syria's membership from the League
77
. 
Gulf States represented by Kuwait, Bahrain, and KSA, along with other GCC 
member states, recalled their ambassadors from Syria, and recognized the NSC as the 
legitimate representative of the Syrian people
78
. Furthermore, EU member states such 
as France, the United Kingdom, along with the United States and Turkey, called for 
President Assad to resign, and acknowledge the SNC as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Syrian people. 
The Syrian government and its armed forces is to date proceeding with its operation 
against the so-called "Armed rebellious, armed gangs and extremists"
79
, while the 
rebellious opposition struggles to gain international support in order to effectively 
retaliate. The latter is an endeavor to liberate the Syrian territories from the despised 
regime, and achieve the ultimate goal of ousting Assad from power. 
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Amidst the mounting international pressure against Assad's regime and the increasing 
regional fear of exporting instability in Syria to other neighboring countries, the 
clashes between armed opposition and the regimes armed forces have reached their 
highest level. After three years of this internal struggle, the death toll in Syria 
attained a striking 220,000 people
80
. Reports claim that Assad is backed by his 
regional allies, namely Hezbollah and Iran, and is accused of using chemical 
weapons against civilians, causing massive violations of universal values and 
standards.  
This has led to blaming the ruling regime of committing war crimes against 
humanity
81
, thus, triggering an international response to immediately act upon the 
Syrian crisis.   
Intervention and the Syrian context 
Starting with the early stages of the Syrian revolution, the Arab League 
commissioned a special convoy to monitor the implementation of the peace plan
82
 
that was agreed upon with the Syrian government. The plan called for the suspension 
of the armed forces operations against civilian protestors, and urged the Syrian 
government to comply with the demands of its citizens. However, this initiative 
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failed to achieve its objectives, and the monitors' role was suspended and withdrawn 
from the country following Syria’s expulsion from the Arab League83.  
States’ positions vis-a-vis the Syrian predicament have varied due to the complexity 
of the crisis, as well as the parties involved, which had played a significant role in 
mobilizing members of the international community to act upon what is happening in 
Syria.  
The intensity of declarations and condemnations has evolved with the intense rise of 
the clashes. After several months of the brutal crack-down by the regime against the 
protestors, the United States president declared that the U.S. would be monitoring the 
Syrian situation attentively in order to evaluate the required level of American 
involvement. Consequently, five months later, a stronger declaration was made 
positioning the US administration against Assad, urging him to "step-aside" due to 
the regimes’ reactions towards civilian protestors. The US also called for the 
enforcement of their universal rights, the cessation of torturing opposition leaders, 
and imposing sieges on several cities. In addition, it imposed sanctions on Syria’s 
energy sector in an attempt to increase the economic and political pressure on the 
regime, while stressing on the right of Syrian people to live within a democratic 
system that ensures freedom and equality for all its citizens. However, The US also 
declared that it respected the Syrian people’s desire of "not interfering in the internal 
situation" by any foreign power. The US meddling in the Syrian situation was strictly 
restricted to tightening the sanctions and isolating the regime politically and 
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economically, which occurred through banning oil imports from Syria, and urging 
other regional countries to amplify the actions of the international community by 
adapting and supporting them themselves. The US president concluded by stating: 
"The Time has come for him to step aside and leave this transition for the Syrian 
themselves, and that is what will continue to work to achieve"
84
 with an emphasis on 
the Syrian people's courage and right in demanding a democratic transition, 
"President Assad now has a choice, he can lead that transition or get out of the way" 
he urged the regime to stop the violent responses against the protesters and respect 
their universal rights
85
 
Simultaneously, the United Kingdom’s position towards the Syrian regime was 
clearly stated by its prime minister, who called for international actions under the 
Security Council to end to the Syrian situation: "We must not stay silent", he 
declared, in condemnation of the Assad regime "President Assad has lost the consent 
of his people" he stated in a televised interview with Al-Arabiya
86
. "We stand ready 
to take fresh resolutions….daring others if they want to veto those resolutions", he 
declared in response to the bloodshed carried by the Syrian regime against its 
citizens. As a matter of fact, the British prime minister also declared that the Syrian 
circumstances were different from those in Libya. However, this did not signify that 
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the international community should not take all actions in support of the Syrian 
opposition, and in facilitating humanitarian assistance. While addressing the Russian 
president, he said that the UN Security Council should take tough actions against "a 
regime that has brutalized its own people", in an attempt to free the Syrian people 
from the situation they are suffering from
87
. 
France, on the other hand, having assumed the role of a major player in the Libyan 
crisis, was amongst the first countries to call for ground international intervention in 
Syria. It cooperated closely with the UK to mobilize the international community in 
an attempt to end the atrocities committed against Syrian civilians
88
. 
However, irreconcilable views emerged on the international scene such as China and 
Russia’s growing frustrated efforts to reach consensus on a resolution against the 
Syrian regime at the United Nations Security Council, blaming the US and Britain of 
interfering in Syria’s internal affairs, and disregarding the values of its sovereignty. 
While re-calling the international approach practiced in the case of Libya, both China 
and Russia decided to view the Syrian crisis from a different perspective.  Bearing in 
mind that Syria has always been a traditional economic and political ally—having 
ongoing bilateral relations with the East— particularly with China, Russia, and Iran, 
as opposed to its semi-Western alliance concerning issues relating to the Middle East. 
The Russian Prime Minister blamed Western powers for interfering in Syria’s affairs 
and worsening its crisis, he claimed that the West’s call for Assad to step aside was 
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just a provocation, and not a genuine effort to insure a peaceful settlement
89
. He 
blamed western governments of influencing the Arab league's decision to suspend 
Syria from the Arab League, while insisting that Russia did not wish to witness a 
scenario similar to the Libyan one. He also reasserted his government’s support for 
the Syrian regime, and strongly backs all efforts to stop the violence through political 
dialogue. He even stressed on the fact that enforcing a no-fly zone on the Syrian 
territories would violate the sovereignty of Syria.  
Russia emphasized that it was the Syrian people’s decision regarding who should 
rule them, and the manner in which they ought to live their lives.  According to its 
foreign minister, the international community’s role is restricted to helping Syrians 
‘sit together’ and decide the future of their country, rejecting European and American 
sanctions on the Syria regime, viewing them as being unilateral
90
. 
The Russian president also laid stress on the importance of respecting Syria’s 
sovereignty, viewing the instability Syria is facing as an internal dilemma that should 
be dealt with by affirming the legitimacy of the Assad regime’s actions concerning 
the rebellions. He also defended Russia’s maintenance of its economic and military 
assistance to the regime, rejecting any possible direct military intervention in Syria or 
the use of force if not approved by the United Nations
91
.   
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Both Russia and China continued to play a vital role in the Syrian crisis with its 
repeated attempts at calling for direct negotiations between the opposition and the 
regime, endeavoring to end the ongoing crisis and both countries have perennially 
been staunch supporters of a non-intervention settlement of the Syrian Crisis
92
. 
At the United Nations on February 4, 2012
93
, the Security Council failed to pass a 
resolution condemning the Assad regime of practicing violent repression against the 
protestors. This was primarily due to Russia and China’s use of their veto power 
which resulted in a non-binding resolution endorsed by the UN General Assembly.  
As a result, the United Nations, along with the Arab League on February 24, 2012, 
played an additional critical role in urging its member states to adopt all necessary 
measure to end the Syrian crisis
94
. The UN Secretary General appointed former 
Secretary General Kofi Anan
95
 to lead a special joint convoy to monitor the ceasefire, 
and initiate reconciliatory efforts to end the ongoing Syrian situation. All of these 
attempts were followed by a series of other initiatives and agreements between 
members of the international community
96
. 
The convoy focused on a six-point peace plan for the Syrian predicament which main 
aim was to bring about an immediate ceasefire and political dialogue between the 
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parties involved, and ensuring the provision of humanitarian assistance. Mr. Annan 
resigned from his position after a series of discourse attempts owing to the 
intransigence of both antagonists to comply with the peace plan provisions, and the 
failure of the Security Council in reaching a consensus towards ending the situation 
peacefully
97
. Replacing Kofi Annan, Lakhadar Ibrahimi was appointed as the new 
peace envoy to Syria. Unfortunately, his efforts have so far been unrewarded as he 
attempts to arrive at a political and diplomatic settlement of the ongoing Syrian 
crisis. 
Due to the escalating level of violence in Syria, the UNSC in 2012 managed to 
unanimously adopt resolution 2042, calling for setting up a United Nations 
Supervision Mission to Syria. The mission was composed of three-hundred unarmed 
military observers including a number of international civilian staff to monitor a 
cessation of the armed conflict at all levels and from all groups involved. In addition, 
it was intended to facilitate the implementation of the six-point peace plan called for 
by the UN and Arab League special envoy on Syria
98
. This resolution was 
unanimously adopted since its clauses contain condemnation of all parties involved 
in the Syrian conflict as a whole and therefore, not only holding the regime 
responsible for all the committed atrocities. It reaffirmed the international 
community’s intentions to end the Syrian crisis swiftly and diplomatically under 
multilateral consensus.  
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The international condemnation of the committed violence is clearly perceived in the 
following clause: 
“Condemning the widespread violations of human rights by the Syrian authorities, as 
well as any human rights abuses by armed groups, recalling that those responsible 
shall be held accountable, and expressing its profound regret at the death of many 
thousands of people in Syria"
99
 
Gaining international attention and priority on the political scene, the situation in 
Syria evolved from being a demonstration calling for political reform, to an internal 
armed conflict between the regime and opposition represented by different armed and 
political groups under the coalition. It eventually developed into a regional struggle 
with the involvement of regional parties directly and indirectly. 
The ongoing Syrian crisis has resulted in disagreement and dissension on the 
international scene. Various countries view the situation as a threat to regional and 
international peace and stability, with reports from major international human rights 
organization drawing attention to massive human rights violations and rights 
oppression. Other states perceive the crisis as an internal struggle the regime is facing 
against rebellious groups accused of disturbing the stability of the country. This 
divide is due to the sensitivity of Syrian characteristics, both regional and 
geopolitical aspects as well as the political dimensions it carries within its nuances. 
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The polarization in the international positions towards the Syrian situation lasted 
until On August 21, 2013, the regime stood accused of using chemical weapons in 
the suburbs of Damascus killing hundreds of civilians, mostly children
100
. The 
government denied its responsibility for carrying out these attacks and blamed the 
rebellious opposition groups, claiming it was an attempt to pressure the government 
at the international level
101
. 
It is worth noting that the use of chemical weapons is a serious violation of 
international humanitarian law in all circumstances, even though Syria is not 
amongst the countries that have signed a treaty preventing them from using these 
weapons.  
The agreement concerning the prohibition, production, stockpiling, and the use of 
chemical weapons, in accordance to international law, bans the use of these weapons 
in all armed conflicts. 
 Syria’s use of chemical weapons was regarded as a war crime, and an offence 
against humanity. Consequently, the United Nations Security Council established a 
commission to investigate the allegations concerning their employment in Syria
102
. 
The commission's main mandate was to investigate several alleged chemical attacks, 
including three in Al-Ghouta. This issue caused an international outrage, and the 
                                                          
100 UN News Center. "‘Clear and convincing’ evidence of chemical weapons use in Syria, UN team 
reports." 16 Sept. 2013. the United Nations 
101 McDonnell, Patrick J. "Syria's Assad denies use of chemical weapons." the Los Angeles Times 26 
Aug. 2013 
102 Council on foreign relations. UN Resolution on Syrian Chemical Weapons. 27 Sept. 2013 
62 
Syrian regime was threatened with airstrikes that would be conducted by the United 
States, the United Kingdom and France, and targeted at Syria’s military chemical 
weapon stockpile. Russia, however, continued playing its political/diplomatic role in 
its endeavors to settle the situation peacefully by persuading the Syrian regime to 
dismantle its chemical weapons under the supervision of the United Nations. 
The United Nations’ reports confirming the use of chemical weapons became a major 
turning point for Syria and the international community.  However, the report could 
not determine precisely the party responsible for using the chemical weapons. The 
international community managed to reach a level of consensus at the UN through 
unanimously voting in favor of Resolution 2118 on September 27, 2013, which 
established a framework for the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons in the 
swiftest and safest manner by organizing a team headed by the United Nations and 
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The resolution passed as 
a result of an agreement between the United States and Russia to dismantle or 
destroy the factories and depots where the chemical weapons kept
103
.  
Syria’s vicious and seemingly irresolvable predicament has persisted for the past five 
years. Unfortunately, with the inexistence of firm international positions that would 
put an end to the ongoing humanitarian disaster, the death toll in Syria attained an 
incredible number, and the number of its refugees increases steadily as they seek 
refuge in neighboring countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey, reaching a 
staggering 4 million mark.  
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Members of the international community are seemingly reluctant to interfere in the 
crisis and, so far, the sole witnessed intervention in the Syrian crisis has been of a 
political/diplomatic, mostly insignificant, rhetorical nature supported by the UN
104
.  
The main reason provided for this passivity or unassertiveness on the international 
community’s part is because of the complexity and sensitive nature of the conflict. 
This issue will be subsequently discussed in the next chapters of the dissertation. 
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On Bahrain  
Historical overview 
This small island-country on the shores of the Arabian Gulf is located on the 
northwestern shore of Qatar and Iran’s western coast, it is connected to the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia by means of the King Fahad causeway, and the Khalifa royal family 
has been ruling Bahrain since the 18
th
 century
105
. 
Bahrain gained its independence in 1971, following the withdrawal of British troops. 
In 2002, the state became one of the smallest modern democratic constitutional 
monarchies
106
 consequent to the approval of its charter reform referendum
107
.  
It holds a significant strategic location, making it a fertile soil for regional claim of 
being part of its territories. In 1957 Iran described Bahrain in an official statement as 
being its 14
th
 province, creating an international hassle that ended after several 
regional and international initiatives and negotiations held at the UN level, when a 
referendum was organized and resulted in identifying the country as a fully 
independent state, ending the political and diplomatic dispute between Bahrain and 
Iran. This cycle of asserting historic claims reappeared after several turning points in 
the history of both countries.
108
.  
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It is worth noting that Bahrain’s demographic structure consists of a majority of 
Muslims as opposed to an extremely small minority of native Christians
109
. Although 
there are no accurate official figures, the majority of the Muslim population is Shiite 
Muslims, and the rest of its citizens belong to the Sunni sect
110
.  
Bahrain has one of the fastest growing economies in the region. It also benefits from 
well-established international relations due to its extremely delicate situation both 
demographically and geographically.  
The ruling system is controlled by the Sunni Khalifa dynasty, while, as mentioned 
earlier, the majority of Bahrain’s population consists of Shiite Muslims. Although the 
Kingdom has undertaken several political and social reforms, Bahrain has 
experienced a series of turbulent situations since the nineties, with its citizens calling 
for democracy and political freedom. The upheavals have occurred amongst claims 
concerning the unequal distribution of wealth, limitations in civil rights, and the 
increasing high level of poverty in this relatively oil-rich Kingdom
111
. 
The Bahraini revolution 
In early 2011, and amid the demonstrations and uprisings taking place in the Middle 
East and North Africa, the cluster of 33 islands constituting the Kingdom of Bahrain 
had its share of the revolutionary waves of change inspired by its neighboring 
countries. Fueled by the early victories  achieved in several Middle-Eastern and 
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North African states, a number of protests were organized by a group of activist 
calling for political, economic, and constitutional reform, the preservation of political 
freedoms, the release of political prisoners, and equality for all segments of  the 
Bahraini population.  
The democracy inspired protest developed into a massive demonstration when on 
February 14, 2011, tens of thousands gathered at the Pearl Roundabout calling for 
democracy enforcement. This led to a crackdown when government forces resorted 
to the use of force against the camping protestors in an attempt to evict them from the 
Pearl Roundabout
112
. Resultantly a number of camping protestors were reportedly 
killed, and hundreds injured. The armed forces viewing their activities as illegal acts, 
managed to arrest the demonstrators under the pretext of resisting their orders. The 
regime declared that the protestors were armed and intended to destabilize the 
country, in spite of receiving several warnings to dismantle the camped protest 
occurring in one of the major and busiest highway intersections of the capital
113
. 
The government closed the Pearl Roundabout after the incident, banning all types of 
gatherings and protests in attempt to deter any potential security crackdown 
following the latest disobedience of the protestors (as described by the government). 
Shortly after, protestors attempted to head back to the Pearl Roundabout, however, 
they were confronted by armed troops who controlled the roundabout at the time, and 
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so, thousands of Bahraini's altered their gathering place to al Salmaniya after being 
prevented from reaching the Pearl Roundabout
114
. Calling for the removal of Sheikh 
Hamad Al-Khalifa from power, the demonstrations attempted to mobilize various 
segments of the Bahraini demography in support of the attacked protestors. They 
organized a march towards the Pearl Roundabout in an attempt to reoccupy it
115
.  
The police warning failed to dissuade the protestors who managed to regain the 
square in a display of national unity. The roundabout became a symbol of rights and 
freedom for the Bahraini revolts, while their capital awaited reform and democracy. 
In response, the Bahraini government, through its crown prince, called for a national 
dialogue in recognition of the demands the protestors were calling for. The dialogue 
endeavored to achieve reconciliation between the opposition and regime. The 
opposition also appealed the establishment of a new constitution, affirming the right 
of citizen's participation and equal representation for the whole population. In 
addition, it accused the government of holding vague and ambiguous reform 
intentions
116
. 
As thousands of citizens gathered at the Pearl Square, the demonstrations spread to 
the whole country. Addressing a variety of complaints, it also accused the state of 
attempting to alter the religious face of the country through its oppression of the 
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Shiite majority. The protestors called for overthrowing the ruling regime, and 
discontinuing all dialogue efforts with it.  
On February 23, 2011, approximately a quarter of the Bahraini population took the 
streets in one of the largest demonstrations in Bahrain's history
117
, calling for a 
constitutional monarchy and a representative elected government by pressuring the 
Khalifa regime to hold immediate reforms in response to massive marches’ requests. 
These events led to a division in the Bahraini population between the supporters and 
opponents of the Khalifa rule, leading in many cases to direct clashes between both 
groups such as the University of Bahrain incident
118
. Besides the failing reform 
negotiations, clashes were ceaselessly occurring between the protestors and the 
armed forces.  
The Bahraini issue remains unresolved amid the continuing regional and 
international support for the regime, and the accused media blackout concerning the 
concealed truth about what is really happening in the country. Two years after the 
Pearl Roundabout incident, the crisis in Bahrain remains unresolved as the opposition 
continues to organize ‘silent protests’ and demonstrations in response to the unending 
repression of the Shiite population as practiced by the ruling Sunni regime. 
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Intervention and the Bahraini context 
As compared to the revolutions occurring in the Middle East and North Africa, the 
Bahraini situation adopted a different dimension since the protests that occurred were 
confronted by a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) supported intervention. It provided 
aid to the government against the protests, assisting the regime to regain supremacy 
and stability.  
Member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council viewed the Bahraini protest as a 
threat that could result in unpredictable events and an unstable political situation in 
the region and reasonably intensifying sectarian tensions in the region
119
. Thereby, 
they called for an emergency meeting, alarmed by the fact that the revolutions had 
reached their shores, and expressed their support to the Khalifa regime
120
 by claiming 
that the protests had undeclared intentions or a secret agenda to spread instability to 
the whole region. They also considered the unrest inspired by regional actors, 
particularly Iran. The latter was viewed as the main suspect for inciting the unrest, 
conspiring through the Shiite protestors to topple the Bahrain, Sunni regime. 
Bahrain's possesses similar nuances to that of Libya and Syria. However, what is 
significant in this affair is that the sole foreign intervention which occurred was that 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council—led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—lending 
military assistance to the government (rather than the dissidents) in response to the 
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demonstrations. When on March 14, 2011, Saudi Arabia in an unprecedented move, 
led GCC military force of thousands into Bahrain, the Bahraini monarch declared a 
temporary state of emergency and martial law rule. The state of emergency ended in 
June after it had succeeded in clearing the Pearl Roundabout from the protestors and 
removing all the iconic symbols of the revolution. This was an attempt to end the 
anti-governmental demonstrations, and regain confidence and support for Bahrain’s 
national security and stability
121
. 
“The Ministerial Council (Foreign Ministers) of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) today confirmed that its countries and peoples categorically reject any foreign 
attempt to intervene in their internal affairs, announcing that it would instead face 
with firmness and decisiveness whoever tries to tamper with their security and 
interests or spread the seeds of rift and sedition among their peoples.”122 It is evident 
that the GCC states viewed the situation in Bahrain as an attempt by Iran to apply a 
subversive strategy by proxy through the Shiite population
123
. 
Meanwhile, Iran’s foreign minister called upon the United Nations’ secretary general 
and the Organization of Islamic Conference to address the Bahraini situation, and 
condemn the GCC’s foreign intervention in that country. As a reaction to the 
intervention, Iran withdrew its ambassador from Bahrain’s capital.  
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The international response to the crisis in Bahrain was based on the fact that this very 
small island has an extremely, sensitive strategic geographic position, located as it is 
in the heart of the Arabian Gulf, bordering Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Iran. In addition, 
it is the ‘home’ of the Fifth US naval fleet, one of the largest US bases in the region 
and yet, the political decision in Bahrain is influenced by its regional occurrences. 
In response to the Pearl Roundabout incident, the United Nations, through its Human 
Rights Commissionaire, Ms. Navi Pillay, stated that she "was deeply alarmed by the 
escalation of violence by security forces in Bahrain", describing it as a "blatant 
violation of international law". Since then, there have been further reports of arbitrary 
arrests, killings, beatings of protestors and of medical personnel, and the takeover of 
hospitals and medical centers by various security forces. The United Nations has 
urged the Bahraini government to cease all means of violence against unarmed 
protestors, disarm vigilant groups, and initiate a national dialogue to facilitate ending 
an escalating, unstable situation
124
.  
However, since the Bahrain situation was not referred to the United Nations Security 
Council, the latter was unable to address this crisis as such. In fact, the council 
cannot address the Bahraini situation unless it is placed on its agenda upon 
recommendation of the Secretary General or by a member state, viewing the issue as 
an internal matter. The US Department of State expressed its grave concern at the 
escalating violence, urging all members to engage in a national dialogue in 
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realization of both parties' demands and positions
125
. In the meantime, the US 
President urged the Bahraini king over a phone conversation to respect the "universal 
rights" of the Bahraini people
126
. Furthermore, The US State Department urged "all 
demonstrators to refrain from acts of violence and ... police and security forces also 
to avoid excessive use of force"
127
. What is evident in the Bahraini case is that the 
United States has not called for the Al-Khalifa regime to relinquish power, while 
asserting that the situation was being dealt with through reforms and negotiations 
with the opposition, and other conciliatory initiatives implemented by the regime. 
Russia, on the other hand, issued a statement supporting the idea of holding a 
national dialogue in an attempt to ease the situation
128
. The UK, however, through its 
foreign secretary, solely expressed its concerns on the "unacceptable violence" 
practiced by the armed forces
129
. The main reason for the international community 
not focusing on Bahrain is because the situation had supposedly been dealt with 
through the regional bodies represented by the GCC.  In addition, the international 
community's attention was shifted towards the escalating and recurring situation in 
Syria. 
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The Bahraini situation was never discussed at the United Nations Security Council 
even though a temporary state of emergency and martial law had been applied. 
However, a foreign intervention in the form of major human rights organizations 
occurred amidst the growing international condemnations of the use of force and 
escalating violence.  The only international response towards the situation in Bahrain 
consisted of urging its government to "respect its international obligations and 
commitments towards respecting human rights and freedom of speech"
130
. 
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Chapter IV 
Intervention and the cases of Libya, Syria and 
Bahrain: Realism vs. The Responsibility to Protect 
This analyzes the three cases from the perspective of realism and the responsibility to 
protect. It will demonstrate that neither realism nor the responsibility to protect can 
on its own explain when and why states intervene militarily in other states’ affairs. It 
will demonstrate that in order to understand foreign military intervention these two 
approaches should be used. 
The "Responsibility to Protect" in the Libyan, Syrian and Bahraini 
context 
What is significant about the Libyan sequence of events is that within an approximate 
period of only eight months, the forty two year old ruling regime was ousted from 
power, through the support of the international community. A newly established 
body had gained international recognition, and is currently responsible for Libya's 
political future. While on the other hand, the Syrian crisis has been in progress since 
March, 2011, and as the level of clashes intensifies, the international community is 
accused -in comparison to other unrest situations in the region - of adopting a 
moderate, constrained tone as a mean to end the ongoing conflict peacefully and 
diplomatically. Although the intentions of the international community to put an end 
to this bloodshed have been concretized, regional and international diplomatic efforts 
75 
to end the Syrian crisis have increased gradually. While Bahrain’s revolution did not 
attract significant attention on the international level, and was the first revolution to 
be subdued in a changing region, the international community was accused of using a 
mild discourse in their criticism of the ruling regime's reaction vis-à-vis the 
protestors in Bahrain, through expressing serious concerns and condemnations.  
Member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, along with their allies, expressed 
their concern about the future of the whole region, fearing it would lead to a full-
fledge wave of instability against their ruling regimes
131
, ever since the majority of 
disfranchised protestors belong to the Shiite Muslim sect and consequently, 
satisfying their demands would potentially lead to indirectly increasing the Iranian 
connections and influence in the region. 
The intervention in Libya took place after almost a month, when demonstrations and 
protests first occurred. The decision to intervene was an international one initiated by 
the UN Security Council resolution authorizing member's states to adopt all 
necessary actions towards ending the inhumane atrocities practiced by the Kaddafi 
regime.  
Syria, on the other hand, and after five years of a comparable situation to Libya’s, 
has yet to witness any type of direct international military intervention. Additionally, 
the issue has not yet attained a level of consensus on the international scene, one that 
would warrant intervention. Ever since, the Syrian context has raised the question of 
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sovereignty and regional alliances and rivalries, and led to an international division 
between states that are supporting the regime, and others supporting the opposition. 
As a matter of fact, the only intervention that took place in Syria was 
diplomatic/political gestures, in attempt to peacefully settle the crisis. Bahrain on the 
other hand had a different state of affairs, there occurred a regional military 
intervention in support of the regime; an endeavor to end the unstable situation 
created by demonstrators. 
The Libyan scenario consisted of a revolution that rapidly spread across the country, 
calling for the ousting of Kaddafi, the international community rapidly considered 
the Libyan case as a threat to regional and international stability and therefore, duly 
built a consensus which agreed on an international military intervention to stop all 
atrocities and human rights violations, based on several indicators, each of which 
have played an interesting role in prompting international actions against the Libyan 
government, and intervention was based on the responsibility to protect principles 
that are described below. 
If state terrorism and the implementation of preventive measures against a potential 
threat is one of the major indicators prompting international military intervention, 
Libya has always been projected as a destabilizing element on the international level 
through its historic, anti-western, controversial position
132
. The Libyan regime 
headed by Kaddafi has always used a radical discourse in its statements and 
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declarations on both the national and international level. This was manifested in its 
position vis-a-vis the international community, primarily the Western states, which 
have always been a controversial one, accusing them of supporting Israel against the 
Palestinians, and engaging in covert actions to prevent Arab states’ unison.  
The Libyan regime was also accused of sponsoring state terrorism to achieve 
regional and national goals against Western interests in the region
133
. Libya was in 
fact held responsible for the bombing of a West Berlin discotheque in 1986, the 
Lockerbie incident of 1988, the drowning of a French airliner in 1999 over Niger, 
besides assuming a role in assassination plots against political figures. Libya was also 
viewed as having negotiated with and supported several controversial opposition and 
rebellious fronts
134
. These indicators have led to perceiving the Libyan regime as a 
threat to international peace and stability and actions were to be implemented to 
contain the country as a preventive measure from a potentially dangerous political 
forecast of the Libyan regime, and the influence it might have in destabilizing the 
region. 
As for the necessity to protect human rights, In Libya, human rights has always been 
an issue of debate
135
. Once the revolution started spreading across Libya and the 
crackdown response by the Kaddafi regime against the protestors, heavy clashes 
occurred in several regions, mass killings and atrocities were committed not only 
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against the armed opposition but affected civilians too, leading to massive violations 
of human rights and atrocities against the people
136
.  
These indicators have led to accusing the ruling regime of a brutal crackdown against 
the revolts and its people, and on the basis of the Responsibility to protect doctrine, 
the international community had no other choice but to intervene in the Libyan 
context, as the intervention that was authorized by the UNSC through a NATO-lead 
campaign aimed - in the first place - at protecting civilians
137
. The international 
community viewed the Libyan case as a universal threat to international peace and 
security and the status of Human rights, without any hope of compliance by the 
regime which have declared its intention of showing "no mercy" to the rebels
138
. 
In addition, the Libyan government demonstrated little intention of complying with 
international values and standards. Early condemnations and accusations by the 
international community called for intervening directly to protect the Libyan 
population from Kaddafi and his loyalists’ brutal crackdown. 
In analysis, the military intervention that took place in the Libyan context was mainly 
based on the grave humanitarian situation, from a responsibility to protect rather than 
the right to intervene. It considered indeed that the Libyan government had lost its 
sovereignty rights due to the violent reaction towards civilian opposition and 
protestors. Although it is debatable that the intervention occurred too swiftly, it could 
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be argued, that regional and international entities tried to resolve the matters 
diplomatically, but proved to be unsuccessful in their endeavors. Furthermore, the 
international community represented by the UN, along with the European Union, 
imposed sanctions to pressure the regime. Subsequently, having failed in preventing 
the crises from escalating due to the Libyan regimes' neglect of international values 
and standards, Libya was regarded as a just cause for intervention.  
The intervening parties in Libya were prompted by the declared rightful intentions 
"in protection of Human Rights and to end the war crimes and mass atrocities 
committed against the "Libyan population". Thus, the international community 
intervened as a last resort, after having exhausted all political and diplomatic conflict 
resolution measures. As for the scale, intensity, and duration of the military 
intervention, Libya was subject to a military incursion consisting solely of airstrikes, 
there was never a mention of ground support. The Operation Unified Protector 
(OUP) implemented by NATO has ended following the capture of Kaddafi, and 
decrease of the fallen regimes’ ability to attack civilians.  
Following the Libyan situation, the Responsibility to protect doctrine has come under 
extreme scrutiny, especially on issues related to states’ sovereignty, and the political 
role of states’ interest in prompting international intervention139, issues that are 
clearly evident while examining the Syrian crisis
140
. 
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With respect to Syria, the violence has been going for the past five years, mass 
killing are committed on one side, and cities are destroyed on another, while 
diplomatic efforts have failed to end the crisis. The number of Syrian refugees has 
attained its highest peak, amounting to four million refugees
141
, displaced in 
neighboring Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon, and several other millions internally 
displaced in the country. 
Nevertheless, there is no existent unanimity on the role of the international 
community, which is evident while examining the Syrian dossier, and as far as 
determining the appropriate response to adopt. However, no intervention similar to 
the one that occurred in Libya has occurred yet, despite the clear similarities between 
the two situations. 
The escalation of violence taking place makes it extremely difficult to turn a blind 
eye towards its humanitarian situation, when it's clear that the international 
community adopted a measured approach, due to the unclear envisagement future of 
the country, amidst fear of a political instability and security concerns that might 
break out in neighboring countries
142
. 
However, the Syrian arena developments became a stage for international meddling 
to contain the violence and tension rather than ending it, where fears of resorting to 
the use of chemical weapons or even losing control over them triggers an 
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international concern. Neighboring countries, highly alarmed by the increasing rate 
of refugees, have expressed social, health, as well as economic challenges and 
concerns
143
. 
However, Assad's regime has several distinctive factors that helped in containing and 
minimizing the unrest
144
, or at least in deferring an intervention carried by the 
international community. The regime's regional and international alliances have 
assisted its ability to limit the consequences of the protest at the political level. Also 
Syrian regime still maintains key political and diplomatic representation 
internationally, seemingly cooperating, for instance, in the negotiation efforts. In 
addition to the regime's regional political and geographic dimension as well as the 
unattractive features of several segments of the opposition—extreme and violent 
religious terrorist groups—in the struggle towards ousting the president and changing 
the regime, Syria has received a small amount of sympathy and cooperation from the 
international community 
Furthermore, the Syrian regime immediately reacted to the escalating level of 
protests and uprisings with political efforts to revert the situation, through issuing a 
presidential decree raising basic monthly salaries, in addition to setting up 
committees to look into several political reforms, such as lifting the emergency law, 
clamping down corruption, as well as the formation of political parties. Syrian 
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officials have viewed the revolts as a sectarian project that is instigated by their 
enemies.  
Even though, the Syrian developments have showed that the regime failed to contain 
the uprisings from spreading in Syria, when a number of army generals and troops 
have defected, organizing a nascent that has expanded to create a situation similar to 
a guerilla war against the regimes army
145
.  It is true that official defections from 
army and senior political officials have accelerated the symbolic importance of the 
Syrian revolution. However, the regime still holds key elements of power which have 
helped maintain a thin communication line with the international community, which 
has helped the regime in clinging on to its position for a much longer period than that 
of the Libyan one. 
On another note, the Syrian situation has numerous reasons to draw international 
players, particularly since it holds several strategic long-standing issues at the 
regional level, namely the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the increasing Iranian 
influence, Turkey’s emerging role, and the regional balance of power.   
The main question would be: does Syria represent a credible and obvious case of 
iniquity and injustice? In terms of reports about the violation of human rights and 
mass casualties, and increasing number of civilian refugees in neighboring countries, 
the answer is affirmative. However, several counter factors have prevented the 
international community from promptly intervening against Syria, especially since 
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there has been no concrete regime-condemning evidence. Adding to that, Syria’s 
historic political alliance with Russia and China, both countries totally opposed to the 
notion of military intervention, viewing it as a violation of states sovereignty. 
In addition, one of the major challenges the international community is facing is the 
increasing sectarian tension amongst the Syrian population, due to the involvement 
of extreme religious groups in the opposition against the regime, the lack of unity 
amongst the members of the opposition, as well as the fear for the country’s as well 
as the region's future.  All of these factors are taken into consideration, due to Syria’s 
geographic location in the region, and the unpredictable spillover effects it might 
result in to neighboring countries. 
Moreover, the Syrian regime continues to exhibit a clever amount of compliance to 
international values and standards. It executes this through the usage of a mild 
language while addressing the unstable situation. Official interviews are still being 
conducted by international media with top Syrian officials, in addition to its active 
diplomatic representation at the UN level. Faced with the threat of direct military 
intervention, the regime managed to ease the international tension through joining 
international treaties and agreements as a gesture of its goodwill and cooperation 
positive qualities conspicuously missing in the Libyan case. The threat Syria poses is 
the existent grave humanitarian concerns involving casualties and refugees, taking 
into account that a clear condemnation of the parties involved in committing these 
crime is required. So far, the only option the international community is considering 
84 
is the containment of the situation, rather than directly intervening militarily against 
the regime and in favor of the opposition.   
As the chaotic scene continues to escalate in Syria, the opposition is fragmenting, 
especially with the rise of several independently organized groups calling for 
demands that are based on religious, violent and extreme ideas
146
. Thus far, Syria has 
solely witnessed a diplomatic and political intervention against the regimes actions. 
The intervention has at times been openly supportive of the opposition, and in other 
instances, concerning international values and standards. 
Whilst in Bahrain, popular movements galvanized the population, demanding 
additional political rights and reforms. Political analysts link the protests in Bahrain 
to an existing tension between the two Muslim groups, "the Sunnis and the 
Shiites"
147. Taking into account that the majority of Bahrain’s population is Shiite 
Muslims, and their constituting the majority of the country’s citizens, it is 
conceivable that they would accuse the ruling Sunni regime of marginalizing their 
communities. 
However, these demonstrations demanded the creation of a constitutional monarchy, 
enforcing civil liberties and political freedoms. Demonstrations have occurred in 
Bahrain amidst the allegation of the use of force and unlawful arrests, this has further 
fueled the unrest and at times led to direct clashes between the security forces and the 
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protestors, making Bahrain another Arab country effected by the domino effect of the 
Arab revolutionary wave.  
 What is noteworthy about the Bahraini case is that the sole foreign intervention that 
occurred was that of the Gulf Cooperation Council lending military assistance to the 
government (rather than the dissidents) in response to the riots and sit-ins practiced 
by the demonstrators. The only threat that was clearly considered by neighboring 
countries is that the political and security instability might spillover from the 
situation in Bahrain. In addition, to the fear of the increasing Iranian influence 
through the Bahraini Shiite population carrying out the protests.  
The international community's reaction is best described as a merely rhetoric one, 
through being alarmed by the reported crackdown of the armed forces against the 
protestors as well as the level of political freedom and freedom of speech. The 
situation in Bahrain was not even included in the United Nations Security Council 
agenda. In fact, it perceived the crisis as an internal one. 
The Gulf Cooperation Council supported the regime in its efforts to restore stability 
in Bahrain through its National dialogue initiative, while assisting the Bahraini 
regime end the sit-ins and protests through the GCC's desert shield forces. The 
discourse here was evidently supportive of the regime rather than the protestors, even 
though there were several reported violent crackdowns and violations of human 
rights, not to mention maintaining power for the past two centuries taking into 
consideration the Bahraini royal family’s possession of substantial relations and 
alignments at both the regional and international level. 
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From the responsibility to protect point of view, Bahrain did not witness an 
intervention similar to the Libyan one because there were no state terrorism threats 
and its compliance with international values, agreements and treaties, and has 
substantial regional alliances. The government recognized the necessity of reforming 
several international freedoms and justice related fields and initiated a national 
dialogue involving both parties - the opponents and the supporters of the regime, 
with an aim to solve the situation peacefully. Subsequently, the international 
community does not consider Bahrain as being a case or just cause that merits its 
intervention. 
The indicators that were taken into consideration in all of the above cases analysis, 
clearly explain the international community's response to the situations from a 
general point of view, however, several argument are being raised on the issue of 
state interest and regional geopolitics, which plays another major role in prompting 
international attention and intervention on each of the cases, these factors will be 
discussed in the following part. 
Realism and the Libyan, Syrian and Bahraini contexts 
Employing a comparative approach while linking the circumstances which have led 
to intervention to Walt'z note on international affairs is necessary to better identify 
the different foreign and local actors involved in the three cases, to investigate the 
interest of every actor in each, and at last proceed to display how the actor(s) reacted 
and intervened in each of the conflicts under scrutiny.  
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According to Western analysis, In Libya, the international community supported the 
NATO-led intervention. However, in the Syrian context, no similar situation is being 
considered. It is not an indicator of weakness as much as one of complexity, 
especially when dealing with the different actors involved in the Syrian situation in 
comparison to the Libyan situation. 
The following is a listing of factors from a realist point of view which focuses on the 
notion of state interest through several significant points and factors which have 
played a significant role in influencing international relations in the Libyan, Syrian, 
and Bahraini cases. 
When it comes to Geographical location and geographic political strategy, Libya's 
location situated in the middle of the North African state line, bordering Italy from 
the Mediterranean side, plays a huge role in facilitating trade lines between central 
Africa and Europe. This is in addition to facilitating an illegal immigration route to 
Malta, Italy and eventually to the European Union. The French and the British 
leadership response toward the Libyan situations was fueled by a number of reasons, 
one of which is its geostrategic location on the shores of the Mediterranean bordering 
Europe, and the negative spillover effect it might have on the continent. 
Similarly, Syria's sensitive location in the Middle East bordering Iraq, Israel, and 
Turkey, and the potential threat the revolution (or the regime) poses of  exporting 
instability to neighboring countries through triggering international support and 
dominance race between regional powers. Bahrain's regional competition of 
influence and supremacy between Gulf states and controversial Iran were one of the 
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main factors that led to ending the situation swiftly, even though there were no direct 
evidence of the Iranian meddling in its internal affairs. 
While natural resources such as oil and gas are some of the major role playing 
resources in the 21
st
 century's global economy, its importance have in many time 
influenced foreign policies of major powers. In this context, it is important to note 
that both Bahrain and Libya have oil and gas as the one of the main exported items, 
in addition to other refined oil products, which has played an important role in 
fueling conflicts and interest in both Libya and Bahrain.  
Nevertheless, the fluctuating controversial political acts and statements of the 
Kaddafi regime on the international scene, prompting unconventional responses to 
international occurrences, is another point worth mentioning about the Libyan 
situation. Furthermore, Libya had been perceived as an active member of the so-
called Axis of Evil. In fact, it had the status of an outlaw, an entity to be sanctioned, 
isolated, and contained on the grounds of its alleged crimes against humanity. 
However, the strong ties and bilateral agreements Bahrain holds with its neighboring 
countries was a power factor supporting the regime in clamping down on the 
revolution. In Syria, the strong political, economic, and military ties with Russia and 
Iran helped the regime gain time to settle the crisis peacefully, and in the regimes 
favor, through a clever international approach. Its leader complied with international 
values and agreements to prevent a direct confrontation between the regime and the 
international community. 
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If you look closely into each of the cases, you will find significant dissimilarities in 
terms of parties involved. For instance, In Libya, the major role-playing parties were 
European states represented by France, Britain, and Italy, in addition to the League of 
Arab States, the United States and international organizations such as the UN and the 
NATO. While studying the Syrian context, one can see that there was a strong 
position from both Turkey and Iran, having an ongoing indirect rivalry with each 
country supporting one side of the parties involved in the crisis.  On the other hand, 
The United States and Russia have an international, similar form of rivalry, 
especially at the UN level, due to the geographic and strategic importance Syria 
holds for countries and their allies, European states such as France and the UK. 
China and the League of Arab state also played a huge role in the Syrian crisis, due 
to the fears the crisis poses on the regional level through its spillover effect. 
However, on October 17, 2014, The UN Security Council called for a collective 
effort against the extremist group of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), where 
a coalition led by the US was established to target these extremist fighters who are 
controlling several areas in Syria and Iraq, adding another challenging dimension to 
the Syrian situation
148. This was in continuation of the UN Security Council’s 
resolution 2170, which has called upon member states unanimously and under its 7
th
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chapter to suppress the expansion of extremist groups –namely the Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria group (ISIS) - from expanding in Syria and neighboring Iraq
149
. 
The Syrian regime, represented by its ambassador to the UN reiterated the 
importance of such measures, given that the Syrian government has been suffering 
from these extremist infiltrations ever since 2011, and that the regime will continue 
to fight these extremist groups in attempt to internal stability
150
.  
In response to the continuous expansion of the extremist groups (ISIS and Nusra 
Front – previously described as the unattractive features of the Syrian context) and in 
attempt to Limit the threat of terrorism in neighboring countries, thus a coalition was 
formed to conduct airstrikes against their compounds and bases in each of Iraq and 
Syria, viewing the threat they impose as an international one
151
, where actions were 
mainly adopted to counter terrorism and not in support of the regime nor the 
opposition nor a response to the grave humanitarian situation. 
While in Bahrain, the party that was directly involved in the crisis was the Gulf 
Cooperation Council represented by its member states, the Bahraini monarchy 
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possessed the implicit support of the West, mainly to protect the stability of the 
whole gulf region as previously described.  
An overall evaluation of the above mentioned factors and events occurring in each of 
the presented cases concludes that ‘interest’ still plays a major (if not the only major 
factor) role in determining the approach the international community or individual 
state should adopt, which is significantly dependent on the affected party and the 
type of interest and alignment that would be negatively affected by the situation. In 
other words, even though international humanitarian law and the responsibility to 
protect urges the international community to react unanimously in response to a 
threat on civilians or international tranquility, the will of the states remains to be the 
major determining factor concerning whether to support military intervention or not. 
Furthermore, Russia and China’s staunch position in support of a non-intervention 
approach against the Syrian regime was not witnessed in the Libyan consent.  From 
the realist view, their abstention from voting in the Libyan crisis was due to the lack 
of interest. In other words, neither of them would have been affected negatively 
whether the international community intervened or not. While in Bahrain the GCC 
played the major role because the stability of the whole Arabian Peninsula was at 
risk, in addition to its strong relation with the West, the international community 
maintained its rhetoric position towards the Bahraini situation, it never seriously 
envisaged any type of intervention. 
Therefore, it is safe to state that whether it is an offensive or a defensive approach, 
the major role-playing element after the notion of respecting international values and 
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standards, is interest. Additionally, concerning the question whether or not, every 
human right violation would effectively lead to direct intervention, the answer, 
unfortunately, would be a negative one.    
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Chapter V 
Conclusion 
In light of the ongoing plight the middle-east has been suffering from since 2011, and 
after looking into the various situations which took place in each of the cases of 
Libya, Syria and Bahrain, It is still evident that Arab states continue to face up until 
today several political, economic and security challenges, such as the lack of 
effective institutional accountability and transparency, low socioeconomic 
development outlook, a high rate of unemployment and a weak legislation system. 
Regrettably, these recurring challenges are contributing negatively to the citizen's 
value and living standards, while ruling regimes remain inattentive to the 
development occurring in the international political sphere, from democracy 
enhancement to freedom enforcement. 
The domino effect revolutions that have distressed Libya, Syria and Bahrain, were an 
initial result of a poor comparison of their citizen's statehood - to other western 
democracies - leading to a burdening frustration, and powered by a strong urgency to 
change the long-standing political statehood. Hence, this has resulted in different 
scenarios, since the regime's response to the demands have varied as well as the 
international position. The vagaries in reaction and response are due to the various 
factors, opportunities and consequences the revolutions may lead to, not to mention 
the parties involved and affected, as well as the political and economic nuances each 
of these vagaries hold.  Given that each of the revolution, demonstration, uprising or 
strike has carried several political dimensions, especially the ones that have shifted 
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its primarily focus from social and economic grievances, towards its escalation to 
include severe political demands, which in most cases are linked to the person in 
power, with or without having a clear agenda for the future of the country. 
Nonetheless, it is also evident that the events which took place in the Arab region has 
reduced it to a series of regional, religious, and tribal dilemmas, which have clearly 
appeared to mobilize support and justify their actions. Another crucial factor is the 
role played by national and transnational media corporations in influencing future 
events, analyzing and shaping states’ positions152. 
Even though every revolution has its own characteristics, each of the events that took 
place in the Arab world share a common factor of enthusiasm, and driven by the 
success of neighboring revolutions, which has provided hope to change the status 
quo, yet they all face challenges in organization and cohesiveness.  
With all their similarities, be it the aspirations, methods or reaction, these revolutions 
were viewed differently by the international community, which can clearly be seen in 
the issue of intervention, in response to the events taking place, leading to a 
problematic debate on the responsibility to protect human rights and international 
values and standards vs. states sovereignty in its classic definition. The different 
positions that were adopted by members of international community have raised the 
role played by states interest in shaping its position towards the crisis, and backed by 
the different perspectives on the concept of sovereignty.  
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As a result, the issue continued to address the notion of international law prevailing 
national law which guarantees full respect and preservation of human rights - where 
states are considered as collection of individuals rather than a legal entity, a notion 
which is still ambiguous and lacks coherence between values and application. If you 
look at military intervention as a different mean of war, two different perspectives 
should be taken into consideration: one, the states justification for waging war “jus 
ad bellum” and two, the mean and conduct of waging war “jus in bello”, the 
international community should take into consideration the moral aspect of war as 
being a necessity towards a certain limit to achieve a certain objective
153
. 
However, the rising role of unconventional rights and duties of the states, along with 
the rise of non-state actors that were supported by universal jurisdiction mark the end 
of the Westphalia state system. It is, now, safe to say that there is an evolved version 
of sovereignty in today's global affairs creating an increasingly inter-dependant 
world, where the question of human rights, values and obligations transcends the 
borders of the classic state system becoming a global common concern in promoting 
the protection of human rights on the international, national as well as regional level. 
Nevertheless, if you closely look into the values of the responsibility to protect 
doctrine and the basic notions of the theory of realism, you can clearly conclude that 
the international community still carries to a large extent elements of the anarchic 
system, where states interest would not only influence, but also determine its position 
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towards certain situations, the notion that was found evident in the cases of Libya, 
Syria and Bahrain. However, it cannot be fully practiced without existing evidential 
points of human rights violations, and in spite of the generally supportive attitudes 
towards humanitarian military intervention, unauthorized intervention practices have 
been tolerated in support of the humanitarian purpose
154
. These unauthorized 
interventions happened by encouraging members of the international community to 
act upon cases where states have failed to end or prevent serious violations of human 
rights; even if it's mainly fueled by states' interests, it needs to be justified.  
Backed by the standing evidential points, those of a brutal regime violating human 
rights and values, and committing war crimes against his people while refusing to 
abide and respect international values and standards, the international community in 
Libya was capable of reaching a level of consensus on the international level to 
intervene in Libya, in an attempt to end all atrocities committed against civilians, 
preserve human rights and international values, standards and form of global 
governance through the responsibility to protect. 
Especially that the Libyan regime has demonstrated its unwillingness to comply with 
international norms and standards, leading to intervention it being a just cause as a  
response to the internal crisis, and through a greater source of power on the 
international scene by non-state actors represented by the UN and the NATO.  
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In Bahrain, the GCC Desert Force shield entered Bahrain in March, 2011 in order to 
end the revolution that was taking place in the country, and to assist the ruling regime 
to regain stability. Was this intervention due to the regime’s tentative level of 
compliance and respect to the international community’s demands to decrease the 
violence and initiate reforms, or was it because of Bahrain’s geopolitical importance 
in the region? Although it is a known fact that violations of human rights have 
existed, and violence to pressure the protestors was practiced, yet unanimity was not 
reached and the issue was regarded as an internal riot to be dealt with through 
regional alliances namely the GCC. 
On the other hand, the strangeness of the Syrian crisis is that what started as an 
inconsequential protest demanding the release of political prisoners in Daraa, 
proliferated throughout the country as an armed and politically organized opposition 
against the oppression practiced by the ruling regime. It turned into a state of affairs 
similar to that of a civil war between the armed and politically organized opposition 
and the ruling regime, and swiftly evolving from a revolution to a war. 
It is true that the crisis in Syria carries similar nuances to the Libyan situation; 
however, the international community, after five years of ceaseless conflict, had 
failed to reach a level of consensus similar to the Libyan one, especially on the issue 
concerning ending the ongoing political, security, and humanitarian crisis, taking into 
account that  the number of refugees in neighboring countries has reached four 
millions, with hundreds of thousands internally displaced, in addition to the huge 
number of civilian casualties and combatants the conflict resulted with. 
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Furthermore, the impact of Interests can clearly be seen in the Syrian context, even 
though evidence of international humanitarian law violations, through the Russian 
positioning vis-a-vis the international community; since Russia considers Syria as its 
last foothold in the Middle East's Mediterranean coast more specifically the city of 
Tartus (home of Russia's only military base in the region) has played a major role 
influencing Russia's position towards projecting the issue of sovereignty rights of the 
Syrian regime. Thereby, any possible future intervention would fuel the ongoing 
proxy war by the involved parties in the Syrian situations (mainly Turkey, Russia, 
Iran and Saudi Arabia), thus triggering several Geopolitical concerns that might have 
its consequences on the whole region.  
However, and with all these vagaries in position and response, it is clear that states 
can no longer act unilaterally to preserve its interest or expand its power which the 
theory of realism entail, and if this was the case, it should be justified by serious 
violations of international values and/or project the threat it imposes on the 
international community. These different approaches that were adopted by the 
international community in each of the cases this thesis has investigated reveal the 
important impact interest has in influencing states positions, even if those approaches 
were adopted under the responsibility to protect or mentioned in the UN SC 
resolutions, states will have to participate or vote in favor of collective actions 
continues to unfortunately be measured by its interest. 
In this respect, the intervention in support of the Libyan revolution was unanimously 
adopted by the international community, while in Syria no intervention is likely to 
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happen in support of each of the parties involved, where the only intervention that 
took place was that against the terrorist group of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS) –a party that can neither be considered an opposition nor part of the regimes 
political alliances. However in Bahrain the intervention that took place was in 
support of the regime instead of the protestors, due to the prevalence of political 
interest and will dilemmas on humanitarian values and standards.  
In conclusion, politics is the art of the possible and thus whenever it is possible for a 
state to justify its actions, be it through preserving its interest, projecting a threat on 
international peace and security, or in case of violation of human rights and other 
values and standards, it will do what it pleases to do. The political will of state to 
intervene is determined by evidence of violating states' national and international 
responsibilities, and mainly dependent on the overall interest(s) of the intervening 
parties, and not solely through collective measures, represented by the UN SC or the 
responsibility to protect, along with the complex equation of the latter being a 
pressuring tool for military intervention and a pretext for any intervention 
encouraging resolution by the UN
155
.   
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